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Executive Summary
There are over 800,000 hazardous materials (hazmat) shipments over the nation’s roads each day.
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), terrorist activity related to the
transportation of hazardous materials represents a significant threat to public safety and the nation’s
critical infrastructure. Specifically, the federal government has identified the government’s inability to
track hazmat shipments on a real-time basis as a significant security vulnerability.
In 2004, the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) completed a study to
determine if “smart truck” technology such as GPS tracking, wireless modems, panic buttons, and onboard computers could be used to enhance hazmat shipment security. The FMCSA study concluded
that “smart truck” technology will be highly effective in protecting hazmat shipments from terrorists.
The FMCSA study also concluded that “smart truck” technology deployment will produce a huge
security benefit and an overwhelmingly positive return on investment for hazmat carriers.
The FMCSA study led to the U.S. Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Hazmat Truck
Security Pilot (HTSP). This congressionally mandated pilot program was undertaken to demonstrate if
a hazmat truck tracking center was feasible from a technology and systems perspective. The HTSP
project team built a technology prototype of a hazmat truck tracking system to show that “smart
truck” technology could be crafted into an effective and efficient system for tracking hazmat
shipments. The HTSP project team also built the Universal Communications Interface – the XML
gateway for hazmat carriers to use to provide data to a centralized truck tracking center.
In August 2007, Congress enacted the 9/11 Act (PL110-53) that directs TSA to develop a program consistent with the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot - to facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments
of security-sensitive materials. In June 2008, TSA took a major step forward in establishing a national
hazmat security program by issuing guidance for shipments of Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive
Materials (HSSMs), the riskiest shipments from a security perspective. TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM guidance
includes Security Action Items which specify security measures – including vehicle tracking – that TSA
believes are prudent security measures for shippers and carriers to follow. Compliance with TSA’s Tier
1 HSSM guidance is voluntary but TSA is expected to issue regulations based on the Tier 1 HSSM
Security Action Items that will make compliance mandatory.
Establishment of a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking center is critical to implementation of a Tier 1 HSSM
regulatory program based on the Security Action items by TSA. The HTSP technology prototype was
an excellent first step toward an operational Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system, however, it falls far
short of what TSA needs in an operational system.
This deliverable examines the “gaps” between the HTSP technology prototype and an operational Tier
1 HSSM truck tracking system. It draws upon the work of an Independent Verification and Validation
contractor that evaluated the HTSP technology prototype. It also examines TSA needs related to
implementation of a regulatory program based on Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items.
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1.0

The TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot Technology
Prototype

After the FMCSA finished its Hazmat Safety and Security Technology Field Operational
Test (FOT) in November 2004, Congress directed the U.S. Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to undertake the TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP)
project. The purpose of the pilot project was to demonstrate that a hazmat truck
tracking center was feasible from a technology and systems perspective and to
determine if existing commercial truck tracking
tr
systems can interface with government
intelligence centers and first responders.
The contract for the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot program was awarded to General
Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (GDAIS) of Buffalo, NY in October 2005.
Work under
er the contract was completed April 2008. The contract had three tasks.
1.

Develop and demonstrate a prototype for a centralized truck tracking center that
could be used to continually track truck locations and load types.
The truck
tracking center would also be used to coordinate incident response with a
government
overnment intelligence operations center, state, local, and Federal law
enforcement agencies and first responders.

2.

Develop and demonstrate a non-proprietary
non
universal interface or set of
communication protocols
tocols that would allow alerts and tracking information to be
transmitted from all commercially available tracking systems to a prototype truck
tracking center.

3.

Analyze the feasibility and benefits of applying a risk-based
risk
approach to identifying
and managing
ing hazmat security risks and incidents involving trucks on U.S.
highways; demonstrate the capability of using the Hazmat Truck Security System
(HTSS), with a commercial-off-the
the-shelf (COTS) rules-based risk assessment tool;
and conduct a public showcase demonstration
emonstration of the entire HTSS.

Congress directed TSA to
undertake the Hazmat Truck
Security Pilot project. TSA
demonstrated that a truck
tracking system is feasible from a
technology and systems
perspective.

The Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP) program demonstrated that a truck tracking
system is feasible from a technology and systems perspective.

1.1

What are the building blocks of a hazmat truck tracking center?

Figure 1.1 presents a general schematic of a hazmat truck tracking center. As
indicated in Figure 1.1, six basic functional components – or building blocks - are needed
to build a hazmat truck tracking system.
1.

An XML-based interface with fleet tracking vendors
vendor feeds data to a hazmat truck
tracking center.

2.

A web interface (portal) allows shippers and carriers to interact with the truck
tracking center (registration, e-manifest,
manifest, e-route)
e
and to submit/view corporate
data.

3.

The hazmat truck tracking operations center merges data flowing into it to create
actionable information for government agencies.

4.

A risk (business rules) engine provides dynamic risk profiling of hazmat
shipments between gate-out
out and gate-in
gate
to identify “risky” shipments..

5.

Business process workflow processing and data processing results are
displayed on desktops and workstations in a truck tracking operations center.

6.

A communications infrastructure supports efficient interaction/consultation with
government action agencies,, hazmat carriers, and first responders.

1

The building blocks of a hazmat
truck tracking center are:
1. an XML –based
communications interface;
2. a portal interface for hazmat
shippers and carriers
3. an operations center that
processes data into
actionable intelligence;
4. a business rules engine for
dynamic risk profiling of
hazmat shipments;
5. systems to manage business
workflow and data
presentation; and
6. a communications
infrastructure to support
collaboration with
government action agencies
and others.

Figure 1.1 Building blocks of a hazmat truck tracking center.

1.2

To succeed, a hazmat truck
tracking center needs data.
Hazmat carriers have to deploy
smart truck technology, and
shippers, carriers, and truck
tracking vendors must submit
data to the tracking center.

Shippers, carriers, and fleet tracking vendors have to deploy “smart
truck” technology and submit data to enable a truck tracking center.

A hazmat truck tracking center is dependent on data flow from shippers, carriers and
fleet tracking vendors. Data is the raw product that a truck tracking center converts into
actionable intelligence. Efficient and timely processing of data gives the center the
ability to answer the questions presented in Figure 2.1 and allows it to effectively
support government action agencies when a transportation security incident is declared.
However, a truck tracking center will fail unless smart truck technology is widely
deployed and shippers, carriers and fleet tracking vendors submit data to the truck
tracking center. Currently, there is no regulatory requirement that hazmat shippers
deploy smart truck technology or submit data to a truck tracking center. 1
Industry groups have advocated voluntary measures for hazmat technology deployment
and data reporting.
However, voluntary industry measures – while conceptually
appealing – rarely work. The FMCSA FOT study acknowledged the problem of industryled voluntary programs by suggesting that “government intervention” (e.g. regulations)
will be needed to stimulate smart truck technology deployment and data reporting. This
argument for “government intervention” is buttressed by DHS’s recent experience in its

1
The exceptions are munitions and radioactive material shipments. However, these shipments represent only a small fraction of
the total number of high-risk hazmat shipments in the U.S.

2

efforts to beef up security at chemical production plants in urban areas. In that case, an
industry-led voluntary initiative to upgrade chemical plant security resulted in such a
tepid industry response that DHS had to take the program back and issue regulations to
require chemical companies to institute security programs.
1.3

It is unlikely that hazmat trading
partners will voluntarily submit
data to a truck tracking center.

The HTSP technology prototype design reflected assumptions about
technology deployment and data reporting.

Figure 1.2 shows the timeline of events surrounding the HTSP project.
project began in October 2005 and ended April 2008.

The HTSP

Figure 1.2 The HTSP project began October 2005 and ended April 2008.

The FMCSA’s Field Operations Test was completed a year before the HTPS project
began. While the FOT project report suggested that regulations should drive technology
deployment and data reporting – especially in light of positive ROI generated by smart
truck technology – the time was not right in late 2005 for a regulatory push by federal
agencies. The responsibility for regulation of hazmat shipments was in transition from
DOT to DHS, and a number of thorny technical and regulatory uncertainties existed.
The results of the FMCSA field tests on vehicle immobilization systems and untethered
trailer tracking systems were not yet available, and the concept of operations for a
hazmat truck tracking center had been only mildly developed in the FOT. Moreover,
there was a great deal of uncertainty about the role that regulations would play in
securing the nation’s hazmat supply chain.

3

In late 2005 when the HTSP
began, there was uncertainty
about technology and regulatory
issues.

The HTSP project was hugely
successful in that it proved that a
hazmat truck tracking center is
feasible from a technology
perspective.

Even though the HTSP prototype’s functionality was limited by industry participation, the
HTSP pilot was highly successful. It proved that a hazmat truck tracking center is
technically feasible and that smart truck technology can be crafted into an effective and
efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments. However, the pilot fell far short of
advancing a regulatory and implementation framework that would allow TSA to move
forward with its hazmat truck tracking program. This is not a criticism of the HTSP pilot
or the work done on it – development of a framework for implementing TSA’s hazmat
truck tracking program was not part of the mission of the project team.

1.4

The HTSP technology prototype used an XML communications interface
based on the IEEE 1512 standards. 2.

The HTSP contractor was given the following direction by TSA for constructing a
messaging interface for the HTSP.
“Develop and demonstrate a set of communication protocols that shall allow alerts
and tracking information to be transmitted from commercial in-use truck tracking
systems to a prototype truck tracking center in order to enhance the ability of state,
local, and federal authorities to identify and respond to Transportation Security
Incidents (TSIs). The interface shall also be capable of receiving and processing
information from all other commercially available truck tracking systems.” 3
Appendix A contains links to TSA Universal Communications Interface design
Figure 1.3 illustrates the high-level design for the communications
documents.
interface that was built for the HTSP. Under this design scenario, fleet tracking vendors
are required to report data in a form and format consistent with the communications
standard set by the truck tracking center.
Figure 1.3 Fleet tracking vendors build to a standard communications interface.

The HTSP communications interface was built using the IEEE-1512 Standard for
Common Incident Management Message Sets for Use by Emergency Management
Centers (known as the 1512 Base Standard) and the IEEE-1512 Standard for Hazardous

2

Section 4.5.4 is taken from, “Hazmat Truck Security Pilot – Final Report – Objective 3, Communication Interface
Development and Testing”; April 11, 2008; General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems.
3

A transportation security incident (TSI) is defined by TSA as a security incident resulting in significant loss of life,
environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area (46 USC 701).

4

Material Incident Management Message Sets for use by Emergency Management Centers
(known as the 1512.3 Standard).
It was also built to conform to the National
Transportation Communications for ITS Protocol (NTCIP).
The 1512 Base standard provides messages and data that are common to one or more
members of the 1512 family of standards, which also includes Traffic Incident
Management (1512.1) and Public Safety Incident Management (1512.2). IEEE-1512.3
provides unique messages and data for the communication of hazardous material related
incident information.

The HTSP communications
interface was built using IEEE
1512.3 standards for hazmat
incidents.

An interface requirements specification (IRS) and an Interface Control Document (ICD)
were prepared to support the development of the HTSP interface standard.
The design of the UCI is based on a concept of events and alerts with the interface
receiving and displaying tracking information and specialized alerts. With this in mind,
the HTSP contractor defined an event to be a specific shipment, from gate-out to gatein. A gate-out message indicates the start of the shipment event and a gate-in message
indicates the end of the shipment event. Position updates for this shipment are then
treated as updates to the shipment event. Other message types, such as panic button
presses, are treated as alerts associated with the specific shipment event.

The UCI processes events and
alerts associated with events. An
event is a specific shipment –
from gate out to gate in.

The UCI consists of three IEEE-1512 messages and associated sub-messages.


Message Type 1 - Incident Description (IDX) message. The IDX message
allows event data (messages) to be sent to the central truck tracking center
application. The design of the UCI treats any shipment as an incident or event, with
the start of the incident being triggered by a gate out indication. The IDX message
will always contain the following information:
o

Incident or Event ID – This is a globally unique identifier that was assigned to
each incident at gate out.

o

Timestamp – This is the time the message was sent to the TTC.

o

Event Type – Event type is a standardized list of phrases describing the type of
event. The event type may change during the course of an incident. For
example a shipment being tracked would have an event type of ‘position report’
initially. If the driver then hit the panic button, the event type would change to
‘driver alarm’, while the Incident ID remained the same. Figure 1.4 lists the
event types that were supported by the HTSP
Figure 1.4 The HTTP communications interface recognizes 18 event types.

driver alarm

shipment off course

position report

vehicle hijack

unexpected cargo weight
change

unexpected cargo
temperature change

automatic vehicle throttle
down

automatic vehicle stopping

unauthorized system disabling

overdue shipment

exited geo-fence

accident involving a semi
trailer

location – the reported
latitude and longitude position
at the time of the message

emergency contact number
– the number to call for the
carrier if an emergency
situation occurs.

attempted security bypass
unexpected trailer separation

entered geo-fence

cargo data

5

An incident description message
is used to signal different event
types including gate out, position
report, driver alarm, etc.

The standard requires that each IDX message contain at least one of four IDX submessages.
IDX Sub-Message 1 – Cargo Document
The incident description message
is used to describe a vehicle’s
cargo (type, quantity) .

The Cargo Documents message is used to convey the information typically found in
commercial shipping papers. The Cargo Documents message contains the following
information:
o

Cargo Vehicle ID – An ID number that associates the cargo documents to a cargo vehicle.

o

Cargo Unit ID – An ID number that associates the cargo documents to a cargo unit.

o

Material ID Number – The UN number assigned to the material being shipped. This is also
the placard number(s) that must be displayed on the truck.

o

Quantity – The quantity of the material being shipped. Some of the more common
accepted values are grams, kilograms, ounces, pounds, tons, fluid ounces, gallons,
milliliters and liters.

IDX Sub-Message 2 – Cargo Vehicle
The incident description message
is used to describe a vehicle’s
identification and provide
information on the driver.

The Cargo Vehicle message is used to describe the vehicle associated with the incident.
The Cargo Vehicle message can be used to identify any type of vehicle that could haul
cargo. The Cargo Vehicle message contains the following information:
o

Cargo Vehicle ID – An ID number assigned to the vehicle.

o

Cargo Unit ID’s – ID numbers assigned to cargo units associated with the vehicle.

o

Vehicle Information – Provides the basic information to help in identifying a vehicle. The
UCI is using make, color, license plate and registration number.

o

Driver Information – Provides information to identify a vehicles driver. Currently, the
interface supports the following information; the name and address of the driver and the
name and address of the company the driver works for. The HTSP contracted suggested to
the IEEE1512 committee that it consider changing the driver information to use the GJXDM
person model. If adopted this change would include social security number, date of birth
and detailed driver’s license information.

IDX Sub-Message 3 – Cargo Units
The Cargo Units message is used to describe the trailer or unit associated with a cargo
vehicle. The Cargo Units message contains the following information:
The incident description message
is used to describe a vehicle’s
cargo units including trailers.

o

Cargo Vehicle ID – The ID of the vehicle associated with the cargo unit, if one exists.

o

Cargo Unit ID – the cargo units assigned ID.

o

Contents – If a trailer is un-tethered, the contents of the trailer can be described here.

IDX Sub-Message 4 – Resource Assignment

The close message indicates gate
in status for the shipment – i.e.
that the trip has ended.

The Resource Assignment message is used to provide origin and destination information
for the vehicle. The message contains the following information:
o

Origin, Destination – Provided the ability to describe the origin and/or destination.
Currently, we are only asking for city, state due to carrier reluctance to provide more
information. The interface can support a full mailing address.

o

In addition this message is capable of receiving detailed GPS information, such as speed
and heading, if it were available and of interest to TSA.



Message Type 2 – Close Message. The Close Message is used to indicate that a
given event has been closed from the perspective of the center sending the
message. This message will be sent when a gate in event occurs or when a truck
tracking center operator manually closes an incident.



Message Type 3 - Watch For Message. The Watch For message was added to
the UCI to support risk-based profiling of hazmat shipments. UCI data is provided to
6

a risk analysis system. In the case of the HTSP, a commercial product, Fdfolio™, served
as a business rules/risk engine for the HTSP. The risk analysis system analyzes the data
and assigns a risk score based on different factors, such as the material being shipped
or the vehicles location. The risk analysis system then sends the Watch For message to
the UCI. The message contains the following information:

1.5

o

A hyperlink to the risk system’s web page associated with the reported score. This provides
an operator the ability to directly view and update the reasons for a risk assessment.

o

A risk level score that provides a numerical value for assessing a shipments risk that
corresponds to the DHS threat levels.

o

A quick summary of the reasons for the risk score.

o

The recommended instructions associated with a particular risk score.

The HTSP’s Transportation Event Analysis and Management System
processes and displays event-based data. 4

The HTSP’s Transportation Event Analysis and Management System (TEAMS) is an
event-based system that stores and displays event-based information received in
messages from transportation-related systems and sends notifications when messages
identifying new events are received. TEAMS automatically collects data in real-time
from commercial fleet tracking vendors. Fleet tracking vendors that participated in the
HTSP included Qualcomm, PeopleNet, and Safefreight.
The HTSP contractor developed a basic version of TEAMS prior to its work for TSA on the
Hazmat Truck Security Pilot project. TEAMS – as it stood prior to modification for the
TSA project – had the following functionality.


The watch for message is
generated by the HTSP’s risk
engine to alert the operator that
a significant event raising the
risk profile of the shipment has
occurred.

TEAMS is an event-based system that stores and displays event-based information
received in messages from transportation-related systems and sends notifications
when messages identifying new events are received. TEAMS displays event
information in textual, pictorial, and geospatial formats.



TEAMS uses a web service to receive event-based XML messages. When a message
is received that contains information about an event not in the TEAMS database, a
new event is created in the database. When a message is received that contains
information about an event already existing in the TEAMS database, the information
for that event is updated in the TEAMS database.



TEAMS provides human-readable output in HTML so that a user only requires a web
browser to view the current state of events. Thus, authorized users can access
TEAMS anywhere a computer and internet connectivity is available with appropriate
security (VPN). TEAMS controls access by authenticating users based on user IDs
and passwords. Event information is presented in textual and pictorial format. Event
location is presented in geospatial format.



TEAMS uses ESRI-formatted map data on which event location is overlaid. The map
display can be controlled using zoom and scroll controls.



TEAMS uses email to notify users of new events. Email messages can be sent to
desktop computers, handheld computers, and SMS- enabled cellular telephones.



TEAMS is a Java-based application that utilizes a web server, a J2EE application
server (currently SUN), and a relational database (currently Microsoft SQL Server)
to process, store, and present event information. TEAMS can be easily modified to
process, store, and present any event-based information.

The HTSP’s Transportation Event
Analysis and Management
System (TEAMS) is an eventbased system that stores and
displays event-based information
received in messages from
transportation-related systems.
vendors.

TEAMS automatically collects
data in real-time from
commercial truck tracking
vendors.

The HTPS contractor made the following enhancements to TEAMS to meet TSA’s HTSP
objectives.


User interface enhancements. The TEAMS user interface was enhanced to support
unique needs of the HAZMAT truck tracking application. New data views and
functionality were added.

4

Sections 2.5 – 2.11 are taken from, “Hazmat Truck Security Pilot – Final Report – Objective 2, Truck Tracking Center Prototype”;
April 11, 2008; General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems.
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Additional functionality was
added to the basic TEAMS
product to adapt it to use as a
hazmat truck tracking tool.



Modifications to support risk assessment. TEAMS was enhanced to support working
in an integrated environment with a risk assessment tool (FDfolio). These included
database enhancements, communications enhancements, display enhancements,
and the ability for users to access the risk assessment tool.



Vehicle tracking. TEAMS was enhanced to support vehicle tracking including the
ability to display vehicle history locations graphically.



Alerting. TEAMS was enhanced to support the presentation of alerts needed to
notify operators when new events or information are available.



Access control.
TEAMS was enhanced to provide a mechanism for setting
passwords and restricting access to authorized users.



Material handling guidance. TEAMS was upgraded to allow TTCP operators to access
information regarding HAZMAT materials and appropriate emergency responses.



HAZMAT data storage and display. TEAMS was upgraded to support the acquisition,
storage, and display of HAZMAT truck identification and HAZMAT cargo information.



Access to map overlays. TEAMS was enhanced to allow access to orthographic
maps with imagery of locations of interest.



Geo-fencing. TEAMS was upgraded to support defining geo-fences by demarcating
areas within any polygonal shape and determination of when HAZMAT trucks violate
defined geo-fences. The capability handles both exclusionary and inclusionary geofences.



Local Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) identification. TEAMS was upgraded to
present PSAP contact information for an event based on the location of the HAZMAT
truck in relation to local PSAP jurisdictions.



Points of interest. TEAMS was upgraded to provide determination of and access to
points of interest (e.g., schools, hospitals, power plants) near an incident.



Current weather. TEAMS was enhanced to provide access to current weather
information in the vicinity of HAZMAT security events.

1.6

The communications architecture for the HTSP technology prototype
supports efficient dataflow between system components.

A key system feature that TSA required in the HTSP was the ability of the prototype to
share critical information across disparate systems in real time. Figure 1.5 illustrates
the communications architecture that was deployed in the pilot program. The system
uses the UCI for data communications between the truck tracking centers, TEAMS and
FDfolio™. The interfaces are event-based. When a new event, either an alert or
position update is generated by a connected truck tracking system, FDfolio™ provides an
updated assessment of risk and TEAMS determines whether a geo-fence violation has
occurred and updates displays. Truck tracking center operators and TSA Watch Officers
(i.e., TSA person responsible for managing alerts) are able to use TEAMS to “drill down”
to view FDfolio™ displays allowing review and management of rules that may have
created a risk-based alert. Center operators and Watch Officers are also able to provide
PSAPs with secure access to TEAMS displays in support of emergency response actions.
1.7

The HTSP technology prototype was built around a “concept of
operations” workflow.

A functional block diagram of TEAMS is presented in Figure 1.6. It shows the data type
and flow through the system from the data source to system users. This is a high level
look at the system from an information management perspective.
A Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes the characteristics of a system from the
users’ point of view. For the HTSP, the Concept of Operations specifies the operational
requirements for implementing a centralized truck tracking center and coordination and
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Figure 1.5 HTSP Prototype Communications Architecture

Figure 1.6 TEAMS exchanges data with other components of the
prototype.

9

Figure 1.7 TEAMS supports the HTSP’s “concept of
operations” workflow.

management of Transportation Security Incidents (TSIs). As illustrated in Figure 1.7,
the basic ConOps adopted for the HTSP was as follows:

The HTSP ConOps plan relies
heavily on telephonic
communications. PSAPs – not
state agencies – manage local
response decision-making under
the plan.

1.

A Universal Communications Interface message is received by the truck tracking
center. The truck tracking center processes the message to determine if it is a
routine position report message or an alert message.
The message is also
forwarded to the risk assessment engine, whether it is a routine message or an
alert, to be assessed based on its data content

2.

If the message is an alert, or if the risk score causes an alert, the truck tracking
center operator contacts the TSA watch officer by phone to make sure TSA is aware
of the situation.

3.

The truck tracking center operator creates a three way conference call by calling the
carrier, using a number provided by the carrier.

4.

If the carrier is aware of the situation and it is deemed not to be a TSI, then the
process of resolving the event is left to the carrier’s normal response plans.

5.

If the carrier cannot be contacted, or if the carrier is contacted but isn’t sure if the
event is a security situation, then the tracking center determines the Public Safety
Answering Point (PSAP) with jurisdiction for the event and includes them in the
conference call.

6.

TSA, the carrier and the PSAP collectively discuss the event to determine if it is a
security situation or not. If a TSI is declared then TSA takes over the responsibility
for handling the event.

The notifications of hazmat transportation events are termed “alerts”. TEAMS receives
data from fleet tracking vendors and carrier/shipper systems through the UCI. TEAMS
uses this data to recognize and initiate an alert when a new incident is identified. An
alert mechanism is included in the TEAMS application and is employed to notify the truck
tracking center operators, and other designated workstations (i.e., the DHS TSOC) of
the new incident. The truck tracking center operator uses TEAMS to view all related
data, manage the required notifications, log all actions associated with the event, and
monitor the TSI status until closed.
The TEAMS application is the primary user interface to truck tracking center data. The
UCI collects data from various truck tracking and carrier manifest sources to support
truck tracking center operations. Certain data elements collected from the field are used
to indicate/notify the onset of transportation events which may evolve into a
transportation security incident (TSI) – such as panic button activation, cargo
monitoring exception, off route or geo-fence violation. Notifications may also be
telephonically called into the truck tracking center by TSA, a carrier, or other
federal/state/local government agency.

There is a working definition for
“transportation security incident”
but the criteria that TSA and
others would use to decide if an
incident should be declared as a
TSI was not described in the
HTSP project report.

TEAMS is used to implement workflows and specific processes. In TEAMS, alert and
notification information is presented to the truck tracking center operator on a
workstation screen. On screen is a list of persons to be notified (i.e., TSA Watch Officer,
carrier contact, Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP), etc.). Each listing provides a
method(s) of notification, such as telephone call, e-mail, fax, etc. (or any combination of
these). The TTC System allows for electronic notification via e-mail, cell phone SMS, and
fax. In TEAMS, a “Contacted/Sent” toggle button is associated with each listed
person/agency to be notified. When the “Contacted” button is clicked, a check mark
appears in the box, indicating that a call has been placed to the contact and a record will
be made of this call in the Action Log. The Action Log contains a complete list of all
entries made into the system by external systems or users. Similarly, when the “Sent”
button is clicked the listed electronic notification (e.g., fax or e-mail) message will
automatically be sent and a record made of the transaction in the Action Log. The user is
also provided with alternates for additional (adjoining) PSAP notification to ensure that
entities are notified if the primary contacts are not available.
Initial transportation event notifications are evaluated through the process described in
the following paragraph to determine if a TSI should be declared, and what should be an
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appropriate response. The TTC may help coordinate a public safety response even
though a TSI is not declared.
When a new event is received, the truck tracking center operator reviews the data and
begins the notification process. In TEAMS, on the TSI Details screen, the “First
Contacts” section provides all necessary information to contact and notify TSA staff,
carriers, first responders, and any other entity designated in the procedures established.
In the same “First Contacts” listing, other contact information, such as office and cell
phone numbers, is displayed. The dispatcher makes a telephone call to each “Required”
and “Requested” contact, and logs each successful notification in the TEAMS application.

1.8

TEAMS is a Java-based server application composed of two major
components: the user interface and data services.

TEAMS is a Java-based server application, running on the JBoss 2EE server, composed of
two major components: the user interface and the data services. For developing the
TEAMS user interface, JavaServer Faces with some JavaScript code was used for clientside interaction. JavaServer Faces is a technology that simplifies building user interfaces
for Java server applications by providing reusable components, simplified page
navigation, and a drag and drop graphical user interface designer.
Another benefit of JavaServer Faces is that at runtime, all JavaServer Faces components
get decompiled into standard HTML tags on the user’s browser. This approach increases
the accessibility of TEAMS versus an approach that would have used an embedded
component such as a Java Applet or a Flash Application.
The data services software module was written as a J2EE application with an Oracle
database providing the data storage. Rather than coding specifically for Oracle and
using Oracle SQL queries for data storage and retrieval, the object/relational persistence
engine known as Hibernate 5 was used. Hibernate provides the ability to change the
database without having to change any of the TEAMS query code. A simple modification
to a configuration file allows TEAMS to use another database such as Microsoft SQL
Server or MySQL if needed.
The data services software module is used by TEAMS to store data when a message is
received and to retrieve data when it is requested. Data is received by the data services
module through the UCI interface. When the data is received, the 1512 XML data
message is validated for conformance to the 1512 schema and then the data is parsed
from each XML field.
One important security decision that was made was to do message validation at the
application level rather than the Web Service Definition Language (WSDL) level. Had
validation been done at the WSDL level, it would have exposed the schema in the WSDL
file. Assuming that an intruder would be able to correctly guess a username and
password that would allow access to the WSDL, that intruder would be able to inject
false data into the system because the schema would be available in the WSDL. By
doing the data validation at the application level, access to the schema could be
restricted to only those that received the UCI documentation, adding an extra layer of
security that prevents the injection of incorrect data.
After the data has been parsed from the XML message, some geospatial analysis occurs
before all of the data is saved to the database. This geospatial analysis includes reverse
geo-coding, PSAP boundary lookup, and geo-fence violation detection.
Once the
geospatial analysis takes place, the data is saved to the database. The data services
software also provides a web service interface that is used to populate the TEAMS
graphical user interface with data.
1.9

The TEAMS user interface is composed of multiple web pages that can
be navigated to view event data, user account data, and geo-fence
data.

The TEAMS user interface is composed of multiple web pages that are connected to each
other and can be navigated through to view event data, user account data, and geofence data. Figure 1.8 provides a high level overview of the interaction between the
various pages that form the TEAMS applications.
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Figure 1.8 The TEAMS user interface connects multiple webpages.

The TEAMS user interface is
composed of multiple web pages
that are connected to each other
and can be navigated through to
view event data, user account
data, and geo-fence data.

1.9.1

List view displays high level information for all active shipments.

Once authenticated to TEAMS, the user will arrive at the List View page. As illustrated in
Figure 1.9, this page contains a list of all active events currently being tracked by the
TEAMS software. For each event in the list there is a designation of whether or not the
event has been declared a transportation security incident (TSI). Additionally, the
event’s risk level, the event ID, the date and time the most recent update was received,
the type of event, the status of the event, address, city, state, and estimated population
impact are shown in the list.

The map view shows all active
shipments being tracked on a
map.

The event ID displayed in the list is a hyperlink and by clicking on this link a user will
navigate to the Event Details page for that event. Also displayed on the List View page
are tabs that a user can click on to navigate to the Map View page, Action Log page, or
Emulator page. A user can filter the list of events being shown by clicking on the ‘Set
Filters’ button to navigate to the Event Filters page. A user can change the time zone in
which times are displayed throughout TEAMS by selecting a time zone from the drop
down on the List View. If event data is received by the UCI that triggers an alert, the
“New Event Alert – Refresh TSI List” button will begin flashing indicating that the user
needs to update the event list. This new alert button is displayed on all pages in the
main TEAMS application.
1.9.2

The map view page displays the map location of active shipments.

The Map View page illustrated in Figure 1.10 is similar in functionality to the List View
page in that gives a high level overview of all of the active shipments currently being
tracked by TEAMS. It differs from the List View in that all of the shipments are
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Figure 1.9 Teams list view page

The list view provides tabulated
information on all active
shipments that the system is
tracking.

displayed on a map of the United States instead of in a list format. To obtain overview
information about an event a user can hover over the event’s icon on the map to be
shown a popup containing the event ID, address, type, and status. The Map View page
provides navigational map tools as well as a tool that allows a user to click on an event’s
icon to navigate to the Event Details page to get further event information. The Map
View also contains controls that allow a TEAMS user to turn particular map overlays on
and off as desired. Also displayed on the Map View page are tabs that a user can click
on to navigate to the List View page, Action Log page, or Emulator page.
Figure 1.10 TEAMS map view page.

The action log page provides
information on the things that
“have been done” in tracking
active shipments.
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1.9.3

The action log view page displays log entry data for active shipments.
The Action Log View page illustrated in Figure 1.11 shows all of the action log entries
for each active shipment currently in TEAMS. Each time the TEAMS database is
updated, an entry is automatically made in the Action Log. A TEAMS user can also
manually make an entry in the action log to record anything not entered automatically

Figure 1.11 TEAMS action log view page.

into the TEAMS data base such as a telephone call. The Action Log View lists the ID of
the event, the TEAMS username of the creator of the entry, the date and time entered,
and the text of the action entry. The event ID displayed in the list is a hyperlink and by
clicking on this link a user will navigate to the Event Details page for that event. Also
displayed on the Action Log View page are tabs that a user can click on to navigate to
the List View page, Map View page, or Emulator page.

1.9.4

The action log details page provides detailed information for actions related
to individual shipments.
The TEAMS Action Log Details page illustrated in Figure 1.12 shows all of the Action
Log data for only the event whose details are currently being viewed. This page
contains a table that shows all of the Action Log entries for this event. Each entry in the
table includes the name of the person or system that created the entry, the date and
time of the entry, and the actual Action Log entry text.
Figure 1.12 TEAMS action log details page
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1.9.5

Information on active shipments can be sorted and
viewed using the event filters page.

The Event Filters page illustrated in Figure 1.13 allows a TEAMS user to filter the
events that are currently being displayed by TEAMS. The Event Filters page contains a
radio button control allowing a user to choose whether to display live events or test
events, a checkbox control that filters the display to show either open events, closed
events, or both, and a checkbox control that filters based on the Packing Group of
chemicals. Also included are multiple selection lists that allow the user to filter on Event
Types, Materials, and Carriers. When the filters are modified, the List View, Map View,
and Action Log View pages all reflect the filter options. From the Event Filters page, the
user can also navigate to the Map View page, Action Log View page, or Emulator page
using the tabs at the top of the page.

The events detail page allows
users to prioritize the list view to
display high priority events or
events with a high risk rating.

Figure 1.13 TEAMS event filters page.

1.9.6

The event details page provides detailed information on individual
shipments.

The Event Details page illustrated in Figure 1.14 contains detailed information about a
specific event in the TEAMS system. The Event Details page can be navigated to from
either the List View page, the Map View page, or the Action Log View page. The Event
Details page contains a map displaying the location of the vehicle, map navigation tools,
and map overlay controls that allow a user turn map layers on and off as desired. The
Event Details page provides the ability for users with the proper permissions to declare
the event a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) if instructed by TSA. Summary
Information on the Event Details page includes the TEAMS ID of the event, the sending
source’s ID of the event, the event type and status, the address, the destination, the
material being carried, the estimated population impact, the latitude/longitude location,
the creator of the event, the time the event was created, the time of the event’s most
recent update, and who last updated the event. The event type and status can be
updated by the TEAMS user in this section of the Event Details page. The Vehicle
Information section displays the make and color of the vehicle, the shipper’s name, the
carrier’s name, the USDOT registration number, and the commercial registration
number. The Geo-fence Data Details section shows the names of the geo-fences being
violated by this event and it also provides the ability for a TEAMS user to create a geofence that will ‘track’ the event being displayed.
15

The events details page provides
detailed information on individual
shipments.

Figure 1.14 TEAMS events details page.

1.9.7
The Google map page allows
users to superimpose shipment
data on a Google map and to use
Google map controls.

The Google map superimposes vehicle location/data
maps.

on Google

The Google Map page illustrated in Figure 1.15 is available by clicking on the ‘Show
Google Map’ button in the map control section of the Event Details page. Clicking this
button will open a secondary window that shows the truck’s location along with overview
data on a Google map (Figure 12). This page includes map controls to zoom in, zoom
out, and pan as well as the ability to turn on orthographic map imagery.
Figure 1.15 TEAMS Google map page
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1.9.8

The cargo details page provided information on the type and
quantity of materials on a carrier’s vehicle.

The Cargo Details page illustrated in Figure 1.16 displays information about the
materials being transported during a shipment. Specific information about the material
includes the proper shipping name of the material, the cargo unit ID, the package ID,
the packing group, amount being transported, the hazard class and division, the
material’s United Nations (UN) number, and an emergency contact telephone number.
The Cargo Details page also displays a list of numbers that can be called in no
emergency contact telephone number is provided. These numbers include CHEMTRAC,
CHEM-TEL, INFOTRAC, 3E Company, National Response Center, National Poison Control
Center, Military Shipments Explosives/Ammunition, and a general number if none of the
other numbers are appropriate.

The Cargo Details page displays
information about the materials
being transported during a
shipment.

2004 Emergency Response Guide data related to the material is also available on the
Cargo Details page. This includes Isolation Zone distance data and the actual guide
page data from the Emergency Response Guide. The guide page data is broken up into
three sections: Potential Hazards, Public Safety, and Emergency Response. A TEAMS
user may also enter an entry into the Action Log using a textbox on the Cargo Details
page.
Figure 1.16 TEAMS cargo details page.

1.9.9

The PSAP/points of interest page displays vehicles and points of
interest on a map.

TEAMS was designed with the idea that a Public Sector Answering Point (PSAP) would be
the government action agency that would manage the response to hazmat incidents. For
the HTSP, the HTSP contractor used a medical dispatch center in the Buffalo
metropolitan area as the monitoring point for HTSP systems. The assumption during the
pilot program is that local PSAPs, like the medical dispatch center, would be the
government action agency that would coordinate on-scene response activities when a
hazmat incident occurred.
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The HTSP uses local city/county
agencies (PSAPs) as the contact
points for hazmat incidents. The
nearest PSAP is identified on the
map when there is an incident.

The PSAP/Points of Interest Details View illustrated in Figure 1.17 displays information
about the PSAPs and Points of Interest that are within the proximity of the shipment’s
location. Contact information for the PSAP whose region this shipment is currently
located within is always displayed in the first table on this page. TEAMS users can also
search for PSAPs near the shipment by entering a search radius in a textbox on the
page. The search results will populate a table that will display the contact information
for all of the PSAPs contained within the entered radius. These search results include
the name of the PSAP, its phone number, fax number, email address, distance to the
PSAP, and its direction in relation to the location of the shipment. Each entry in the
table includes buttons to add entries to the Action Log either indicating that a phone call
was placed to the PSAP or an email sent to the PSAP along with a button that will send a
fax of summary information to the PSAP. After the table is a textbox that a TEAMS user
can use to send a summary information fax to a PSAP whose number may not be listed.

Figure 1.17 TEAMS points of interest page.

This page is also used to display any Points of Interest that are near the shipment’s
current location. A TEAMS user can search for Points of Interest near the shipment by
entering a search radius in another textbox on the page. After entering the search
radius, the TEAMS user then selects which map overlays to search from a multiple
selection list that shows the names of all of the searchable layers. Once the user has
selected the desired layers to search, a button must be clicked to conduct the search.
The search results are displayed in a table that lists the name of the Point of Interest,
the name of the layer containing the Point of Interest, its distance from the shipment,
and its direction in relative to the shipment’s location. A TEAMS user may also enter an
entry into the Action Log using a textbox on the PSAP/Points of Interest Details page.
The user rights page displays
user rights that have been
assigned to individuals by system
administrators.

1.9.10

The user management page lets system administrators assign and
manage user rights.

The initial page of the User Management module illustrated in Figure 1.18 is the
Overview page. This page contains an ‘Edit Profile’ button for all logged in users. This
button will allow the user to navigate to a page that will allow the user to update profile
18

information. If the user has the appropriate privileges, the ‘Create User’ and ‘Create
Group’ buttons will be shown which will allow for navigation to the respective pages.
Also, two tables will be displayed that show all of the users and groups that the logged
in user can administer. The user table contains the username of each user, its group
affiliation, an edit button, and a delete button. The group table contains the name of
each group, its parent group, an edit button, a delete button, and various properties
that are used to restrict the group’s permissions within the TEAMS application. The
properties displayed for each group are Create Users, Create Groups, View Classified
Map Data, Alert PSAP, Acknowledge TSI, Declare TSI, Emulator Access, External System
Identifier, and Geo-fence Restricted Access.
Figure 1.18 TEAMS user management page.

1.10

TEAMS allows users to build and manage geo-fences.

Initially the geo-fence solution in the HTSP prototype only allowed a user to create a
geo-fence around an existing transportation event in the TEAMS. This geo-fence’s
location would update whenever there was a position update to the event that the geofence was created around.
Whenever another transportation event entered the
boundary of the geo-fence, the event’s type would be changed to ‘entered geo-fence’
and the TEAMS operators would be alerted that an event had entered a geo-fence.
As more trucks were added to the TEAMS system, the need for a more full featured geofencing capability emerged and the geo-fencing feature was re-designed. This new
design allowed TEAMS operators to create geo-fences in multiple ways using a set of
Geo-fence Designer web pages. Users could create free-form geo-fences by drawing
shapes on a map, they could upload an existing ESRI shape-file from their hard drive, or
they could select geographic features from the existing ESRI shape-files.
Also included in the geo-fence redesign was a new method of assigning violation
distances to geo-fences. Previously, it was thought that the user would create a geofence region and then add various proximity levels to the geo-fence to determine
violations. Consider the following case: a user would create a geo-fence around the
Pentagon and then assign multiple buffer distances to the shape. Trucks carrying
phosgene would be required to remain 10 miles away from the Pentagon while trucks
carrying gasoline would be required to remain 1/2 mile from the Pentagon. This process
would have to occur for each chemical. This becomes a maintenance issue rather
quickly as multiple geo-fences are created. The HTPS contractor addressed this problem
by allowing the TEAMS operator to create a single shape for the geo-fence without
19

Initially, the HTSP prototype only
allowed geo-fences to be built
around an active event. For
example, a geo-fence was built
around a truck and when it got
within a certain distance of a
vulnerable object, the system
registered a geo-fence event.

New geo-fence authoring tools
and a new approach to geo-fence
maintenance were added to the
prototype by the HTSP
contractor.

The effectiveness of the geofence approach developed by the
HTSP contractor is a function of
vehicle location reporting
frequency. If the frequency is
too low, the geo-fencing
approach will not work well.

Geo-fences can be programmed
with different properties. They
may be exclusionary (a violation
when a truck enters the geozone) or inclusionary (a violation
when a truck leaves the geozone).

creating various distance buffers around the geo-fence. Instead, these distance buffers
are determined by each truck on an individual basis. Each truck carrying a chemical has
a buffer that is determined by the Emergency Response Guide isolation zone distance
specified for the chemicals on the truck. Geo-fence violations occur when this isolation
zone distance buffer crosses the boundary of a geo-fence created by a TEAMS user.
An issue that was still remaining with this approach is the overall usefulness of geofencing when position reports are received at long time intervals. Assuming that most
trucks will report every hour, it is possible that a truck may pass through a geo-fence
without a TEAMS operator every being made aware that a geo-fence violation occurred.
Our approach to lessening the impact of this issue was to add a second buffer distance
around each truck that takes into account the reporting interval of the truck. A geofence violation is generated when this second buffer is violated just as it is when the
smaller buffer distance is violated. The formula for computing the second buffer
distance is: isolation zone distance + (reporting interval * speed). The reporting
interval variable is determined dynamically by taking the average time between the last
five messages received regarding the truck and speed is assumed to be 60 miles per
hour.
Various properties can also be assigned to Geo-fences as they are created. Geo-fences
can be assigned a start time and an end time to establish the time period for which they
are active. Geofences can also have a list of chemicals assigned to them designating
that only trucks carrying these specified chemicals will create a geo-fence alert upon a
boundary violation. Also, geofences are either classified as exclusionary zones or
inclusionary zones. An exclusionary zone creates a violation when an event enters its
geographic boundary. Conversely, inclusionary zones generate a violation when an
event exits the boundary established by the inclusionary zone. An inclusionary zone
must have events ‘assigned’ to it and it is only for these events that an inclusionary zone
will generate an alert upon violation of the boundary. Inclusionary zones can best be
thought of as a manner of introducing route adherence to TEAMS.
The revised approach to creating and managing geo-fences has been successful in
adding a more full featured set of tools to TEAMS. Creating a separate set of pages that
allow for the management of geo-fences is more flexible and useful to the TEAMS
operators than just allowing users to create a geo-fence at an existing event’s location.

The geo-fence approach used in
the HTSP pilot will create false
alarms – possibly an
overwhelming number of false
alarms for the truck tracking
center.

The HTSP prototype has a
number of linked pages for geofence management.

The geo-fence general
information page allows users to
enter baseline data on geofences they want the system to
monitor.

The amount of geo-fence management time required by the TEAMS users was a concern
when creating the geo-fence feature. The approach of using the isolation zone distance
assigned to the truck rather than assigning various buffer distances to each geo-fence
has removed much of the burden associated with creating geo-fences. The users of the
TEAMS geo-fence module only have to define the geographic area of interest and the
TEAMS software is responsible for determining all of the violations dynamically for each
truck. This removes much of the burden from the TEAMS operators.
The usefulness of the geo-fencing feature is contingent on the reporting intervals of the
trucks. By creating a second ring around the truck’s location, we are able to detect
more geo-fence violations but subsequently, more false alarms are created.

1.10.1

The HTSP prototype has a number of linked pages for geo-fence
management.

As illustrated in Figure 1.8, TEAMS has a number of linked pages for geo-fence
management. The geo-fence management overview page, illustrated in Figure 1.19,
has a ‘Create New Geo-fence’ button that will let a user create a new geo-fence. This
page also contains a list of the names of all geo-fences that have been created. For
each geo-fence listed there are buttons to view, edit, or delete the geo-fence. Clicking
on the ‘View’ button next to a geo-fence’s name will load the geo-fence’s details on the
overview page. The map portion of the page will update to show the location of the geofence as well as the locations of all of the events that are violating the geo-fence’s
geographic boundary. The map portion contains controls that allow the user to zoom in,
zoom out, pan, and navigate to an address entered by the user.
Other geo-fence details are displayed in a table in the lower left hand portion of this
page. These details include the geo-fence’s name, whether or not it is currently active,
start time, end time, threat level, whether or not it has restricted access, if it is an
inclusionary zone, and its associated materials. Also included in this table is an
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Figure 1.19 TEAMS geo-fence management overview page.

‘accordion’ style component that lists the details of the events that have violated the
geo-fence. Each pane in the ‘accordion’ component has the title bar set to the event’s
TEAMS ID and the text in each pane lists the address, event type, material, and
population impact of the event. Clicking on an ‘Edit’ button will take the user to the Edit
Geo-fence page for that geo-fence.

1.10.2

The general information page lets users enter basic data about
geo-fences they create.

The Geo-fence General Information page, illustrated in Figure 1.20. lets a user enter
general details about a geo-fence that is being created. The user must enter a unique
name for the geo-fence in the text field on the page. An optional start time and/or end
time may be entered using calendar controls on the page as well. Radio button groups
are provided to enter the geo-fence’s threat level, restricted status, and type. There are
also fields that will allow users to specify events to associate with the geo-fence, assign
materials to the geo-fence, and choose the method for creating the geo-fence. If
associated events are to be specified, the user will enter this information on the Geofence Associated Event page. Presently, the only supported option for creating the geofence is ‘Free-form Map Drawing’ but in the future map overlay points of interest
selection and shape file uploading will provide additional options for geo-fence creation.
There is also a dynamic help box on the page that the user can use to get help about
specific geo-fence properties that may not be straight-forward. The user can click on
any of the question mark icons next to a property label to change the information shown
in the help box.
1.10.3

The geo-fence associated event page lets users associate events
with geo-fences.

The Geo-fence Associated Event page, illustrated in Figure 1.21, contains a list that
allows the user to select an event or events to associate with an event in the TEAMS
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The associate event page
lets users link a geo-fence
with individual shipments.

Figure 1.20 TEAMS geo-fence general information page

Figure 1.21 Geo-fence associated event page

system. Exclusionary zones can only have one event associated with them while
Inclusionary zones must have at least one or more events associated with them. If an
event is associated with an Exclusionary zone, there is no need to draw the geo-fence on
a map since the geo-fence’s location is the same as the location of the event. The event
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list contains the ID, address, carrier, material, and event type information for each nontest event active in TEAMS. The address is a link component that when clicked opens a
popup window displaying a Google map of the event’s location. If the geo-fence is an
Exclusionary zone, each entry in the table contains a radio button allowing for the
selection of one event only. If the geo-fence is an Inclusionary zone, each row in the
table contains a checkbox component which will allow the user to select more than one
event to associate with the geo-fence. Clicking on the ‘Next Step’ button on this page
will create the geo-fence if it is an Exclusionary zone or navigate to the Geo-fence
Creation Wizard Drawing page if it is an Inclusionary zone.

1.10.4

The geo-fence creation wizard drawing page lets users create the
geographic boundary of a geo-fence.

The Geo-fence Creation Wizard Drawing page, illustrated in Figure 1.22, provides the
functionality for a user to create the geographic boundary of the geo-fence.
This page includes a column displaying the information about the geo-fence that the
user has previously entered in the creation process. This information includes the geofence’s name, start time, end time, threat level, restriction status, associated events,
and associated material list.
There is also an area that dynamically displays the latitude and longitude location of
points as they are added to the geo-fence. The ‘Back’ button allows the user to return
to a previous page to edit any of the information they have previously entered.

A geo-fence drawing tool allows
users to create the geographic
boundary of a geo-fence.

This page also has a map component on which the user will draw the geo-fence. The
map component contains standard navigation tools such as zoom in, zoom out, zoom to
an address, and pan but it also contains three tools allowing a user to draw the geofence on the map. These tools are draw point, draw line, and draw polygon for each of
the three types of geo-fence shapes that may be created. Once the user has used one
of these map tools to draw the geo-fence, the ‘Save’ button can be clicked to store the
geo-fence and compute any violations with existing events.
Figure 1.22 TEAMS geo-fence creation wizard drawing page
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1.11

A risk (business rules) engine was successfully demonstrated in the
HTSP. 5

The HTSP contractor was given the following direction from TSA.
The FDfolio™ software suite was
used in the HSTP as a business
rules engine to identify security
risks in hazmat transportation.

“Assess the feasibility and benefits of a risk-based approach to filtering hazmat
events and alerts on a prioritized basis in order to minimize false alarms and
facilitate more timely identification of security threats.”
To address this directive, the contractor analyzed the feasibility of using the UCI and risk
assessment analytic capability of the FDfolio™ software suite to supplement TEAMS in
identifying hazmat security risks and distinguishing hazmat events that warrant
enhanced monitoring and/or follow-up action from those that do not. 6
The importance of distinguishing between hazmat events that warrant enhanced
monitoring and / or follow-up action from those that do not is driven by the potentially
large number of hazmat events that could represent security threats and the grave
nature of the consequences of a security situation that is not detected. The goal of this
task is therefore to explore how to eliminate HAZMAT events that are not security risks
without labor-intensive scrutiny while not overlooking real security events.

The UCI and FDfolio™ were
connected to feed data from
hazmat shipments to the
business (risk) rules engine in
FDfolio™.

TEAMS was modified to present the results of risk-based analyses, and the UCI was used
to connect to FDfolio™. These modifications included changes to each system to
support: (1) the needed data sharing; and (2) changes within each system to implement
the new functionality associated with risk assessment activities. Modifications to TEAMS
included changes to the database to handle risk assessment specific data (i.e., risk level,
risk description, recommendations for risk response, and the FDfolio™ URL to allow
access to risk assessment details), and updates to displays to present risk-based alerts,
risk assessment data, and recommendations.
Finally, TEAMS was enhanced to
implement the IEEE-1512 “WatchFor” message used to share risk assessment related
information with FDfolio™.
FDfolio™ was also modified to support the TSA hazardous material truck tracking pilot.
The primary custom component developed to accommodate data exchange and analysis

5

c is taken from, “Hazmat Truck Security Pilot – Final Report – Objective 4, Risk Assessment Feasibility Analysis”; April 11, 2008;
General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems.

6

FDfolio™ is a commercial software product offered by FreightDesk. At its heart is a business rules engine, and this component of
the FDfolio™ product was used for risk-based shipment profiling the HTSP. The FDfolio™ product has many powerful features
which were not used extensively in the pilot program. A description of the broad set of capabilities of FDfolio™ follows.
The “FDfolio™ Suite,” provides a platform for implementing risk-based solutions for freight transportation security. Built into the
suite are several risk assessment tools to support the analysis of risks (i.e., link analysis, data mining, predictive/probabilistic
modeling, GIS spatial, and other analysis tools). FDfolio™ risk assessment involves four processing stages; data sourcing, data
fusion, risk assessment, and risk output processing. Each of these process stages are summarized below.
• Data Sourcing – FDfolio™ employs a state-of-the-art multimodal data architecture organized around commercial freight
transportation data and processes. The system is designed for efficient, high-volume data capture, validation, integration, and
management. FDfolio™ enables data integrity and compliance checks on data sources and enables the aggregation of data from
various and disparate sources. If messages are rejected for either syntax, compliance or data accuracy an error report will be
generated and will provide the error codes and their reason. Error reports can be available online or can be incorporated in XML
document, email or other types of electronic alerts. This information process flexibility enables easy collection of data from
voluntary and/or private sector resources whose information are critical to enabling rich situational awareness.
• Data Fusion – FDFusion™ provides a “connect-the-dots” data repository that captures, reorganizes, and maintains a complete
dataset of transactional, commercial, reference, activity, and status data on individual cargo movements (Rail, Maritime, Air,
Surface, inter-modal). FDFusion™ is the engine that enables the capture, normalization and synthesis of disparate data to enable
both a common operating picture and the basis for information analytics.
• Risk Assessment – FDAnaylzer maintains rule sets in a central/shareable repository, which promotes consistent decision-making.
FDAnalyzer™ provides a user interface to enable analysts and other approved users to create and manage rules. FDAnalyzer™
empowers the users to create their own rules set as opposed to having to rely on technical support to write the rules. Risk scores
are assigned to each transaction based on several factors that assign weights on both an absolute and relative risk-basis for the
discovered threats and vulnerabilities, facilitating smoother prioritization of mitigation tasks. Several additional tools for analyzing
and visualizing shipment information and HAZMAT related risks are also provided.
• Risk Based Output Processing – FDAnalyzer™ provides the interface for the user to monitor the outputs generated by the
activated rules such as alerts on transactions that have triggered user-defined threshold requirements. FDAnalyzer™ presents
transaction-based score results in a navigable drill-down interface, in which a shipment’s total risk score is supported by a detailed
risk-scoring matrix which is further supported by individual rule-based results. A reporting capability enables easy presentation of
FDAnalyzer™ activities and results to other interested stakeholders. This capability is provided using a secure browser that can be
accessed via TEAMS.
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between the TEAMS system and the FDfolio™ risk analysis module was the UCI Data
Exchange Interface (UCIDEI). The UCIDEI is a collection of web services and native folio
“control agents” that support bidirectional data flow and data mapping. A custom
application programming interface (API) used by the FDfolio™ rules is also packaged
with the UCIDEI. The API is tailored specifically for the Truck Tracking Pilot rules and
scenarios. FDfolio™ was also modified to support the process of obtaining data from
carriers that do not support the UCI, other than for position reports. FDfolio™ was
modified to support the generation of messages for key events including gate-out, gatein, alerts, and position reports. These messages also contain information describing the
truck and its cargo. For these carriers, FDfolio™ delivers outgoing UCI messages to
TEAMS to indicate key hazmat shipment events such as gate-out or gate-in.
1.11.1

The UCI, TEAMS, and FDfolio™ interact to provide dynamic riskbased hazmat shipment tracking based on “events” as they occur.

Positioning the FDfolio™ product as the business rules engine for the HTSP prototype
required an adjustment in the way the three main components of the system – the UCI,
TEAMS, and FDfolio™ - worked together. The concept of operations also needed
adjustment.
The HTPS system for risk assessment employs an event-driven architecture. Triggering
events can occur at the carrier, truck, or truck tracking center, and are communicated
directly to both TEAMS and FDfolio™ using the IEEE-1512 based Universal
Communication Interface (UCI).
There are four types of triggering events:
1.

Location update – The HAZMAT trucks generate location updates at specified
intervals and are communicated to the HTSS. The system does not currently
generate alerts when an expected update is not received, but this can be added.

2.

Gate-out – When a HAZMAT truck first leaves the terminal with a load it issues a
“gateout” indicating that the shipment has begun. In some cases, the first location
report for a shipment serves as the gate-out message.

3.

Gate-in – When a HAZMAT truck arrives at its destination a gate-in message is
generated indicating that the shipment is complete. This is complicated in that
HAZMAT trucks can have multiple destinations for a shipment and therefore can
have several gate-ins.

4.

Declared emergency – In addition to the routine messages associated with normal
operations, a manually generated panic button message can be generated.
Additional messages from the carrier or commercial truck tracking systems are also
anticipated in the future such as hijacking, unexpected decoupling, missed gate-in,
unexpected loss of weight or pressure, and etc.

Each new triggering event generates a new risk assessment. The risk assessments are
conducted by TEAMS and FDfolio™ working together. TEAMS evaluates each truck
location update to determine if there has been a geo-fence violation. If a geo-fence
violation has occurred, TEAMS displays this and forwards a UCI message to FDfolio™
indicating the violation so the FDfolio™ can determine a risk level for the situation.
FDfolio™ receives all event messages from the commercial truck tracking systems as
well as messages from TEAMS when geo-fence violations occur. FDfolio™ considers all
information known about the shipment together with the information conveyed in the
message to determine a risk level.
Additionally, FDfolio™ considers historical
information it has for the carrier based on past shipments and consults available TSA
watch lists.
The risk level determined by FDfolio™ is sent to TEAMS for display and alerting. When
risk level is high or severe TEAMS alerts Truck Tracking Center (TTC) operators and
provides notification to the TTC Watch Officer. By considering all aspects of the
shipment, historical data, TSA watch lists, and the current event and situation, the risk
assessment approach attempts to minimize false alarms while enhancing the ability to
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The risk profile of a hazmat
shipment is changes as the truck
moves. For example, when
coming closer to more sensitive
areas, the risk will rise. Alerts
and events can also change the
shipment profile. Dynamic risk
profiling will be an important
feature of the truck tracking
center.

identify high risk situations early enough to initiate a timely response. With this
approach, TTC operators are able to analyze and reconcile risks more confidently based
on a priority ranking using data that compliments the triggering event information.
The data interaction within a
truck tracking system enables
watch officers to make timely
decisions with confidence.

In addition to the determination and presentation of risk levels, the TEAMS and FDfolio™
integration supports TTC operators and Watch Officers in resolving high risk situations.
Information concerning potential impact areas (e.g., population levels, nearby
infrastructure ents), critical contact information (e.g., phone numbers for carrier and
local public safety answering point (PSAP)), and a secure mechanism for allowing PSAPs
and carriers to access the TEAMS displays.
TSA is also able to access FDfolio™ via a link from TEAMS. Once within FDfolio™, TSA
staff may then disable rules based on information from the carrier or truck tracking
center. TTC Operators Watch Officers, and / or Managers are able to use TEAMS to
create a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) when determined to be appropriate.
Figure 1.23 provides an overview of the risk assessment architecture.
systems, data sources, and the interfaces to the TTC and PSAPs.

It shows key

Figure 1.23 The HTSP risk assessment architecture

1.11.2

TEAMS was modified to help truck tracking center operators
monitor shipments with high risk scores.

The following sequence of TEAMS screen shots in Figure 1.24 illustrates what a TTC
operator sees when a hazmat shipment is a security risk.

26

Figure 1.24 TEAMS screenshots – security risks
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1.11.3

Dynamic risk profiling requires a substantial amount of data; much
of the needed data was not available during the pilot.

The success and effectiveness of a risk-based solution for hazmat shipment tracking
depends on the adequacy of the data that it uses. The data will need to be available in a
timely manner and in a usable form. It will also need to be reliable.

Dynamic risk profiling is
important, but the HTSP pilot
could only confirm that it is
possible to achieve it. Lack of
data and development of
workable business rules
constrained what was possible.

Three types of data are needed to support the HTSS risk-based solution: event data,
reference data, and watch list data. Each of these is described below.


Event data. Event data is generated by the shipment itself. It includes data
describing the shipment (e.g., shipping organization, consignee, carrier, contents,
etc.), data defining events associated with the shipment (e.g., panic button, missed
gate-in, etc.) and the updates to the location of the truck.



Reference data. Reference data is used to associate a shipment with levels of risk.
It includes data associated with the material being shipped (e.g., toxicity,
explosiveness, etc.), relevant historical information (e.g., past performance of
carrier, driver experience, carrier and truck route histories, etc.), and infrastructure
information (e.g., location of vulnerable infrastructure).



Watch list data. Watch list data is maintained by TSA. It identifies carriers, drivers,
shippers, and consignees that have high risk profiles (i.e., are known or suspected
to be associated with terrorist organizations or have terrorist intentions based on
intelligence and / or historical information).

Not all of these data are currently available. As more information is made available the
ability to define rules for estimating risk levels will improve. At a minimum, it is
necessary to provide basic shipment data (i.e., carrier identification, event type).
Shipment contents data is also recommended and can currently be assessed using
existing rules in FDfolio™. With this basic data, TEAMS and FDfolio™ can make basic
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risk assessments. As more data becomes available, more accurate and valid risk
assessments will be possible.
Historical data and rules for evaluating shipments against historical norms can be
developed over time and managed by FDfolio™. For example, normal routes and
movement behaviors by truck and carrier can be collected and stored by the system in
confidence, and rules that compare current shipments to these historical data can be
developed.
With these data and rules, FDfolio™ can compare current shipment
information (e.g., updated truck location) to “normal” behavior for that carrier or truck
in conjunction with other factors to determine a composite risk level. Over time, more
complete historical data can be developed, continually improving the overall risk
assessment.
Figure 1.25 summarizes the data categories and indicates the data that was available
during the HTSP. This table also presents the data that are required by the risk
assessment process as it is currently implemented.
Figure 1.25 Data availability during the HTSP program.

Event Data

Shipment Data

Planned route

No

Vehicle ID

Yes

Origin-destination

-

Only one carrier provided origin-destination
information

Shipper

-

Only one carrier provided shipper information

Carriers

Yes

Consignee
Driver

Event Type
(real time)

No

Most carriers refused to provide information
No - but simulated in test

-

Inconsistent

Cargo (quantity)

-

Inconsistent

Truck sensor data

Overdue shipment

Geo-fence violation
Missed gate-in

Carrier

-

Cargo (material)

Shipment off course

Vehicle

Not available – no electronic routes from
carriers

No
No

No

Yes

Determined by TEAMS

No

Yes

Database, accessed based on Vehicle ID

Company name and ID

Yes

Database, accessed based on Vehicle ID

Contact name

Yes

Database, accessed based on Vehicle ID

Vehicle data (e.g., VIN, year,
make, model, registration
numbers, plate)
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Watch List Data

Watch List Type

Driver

No

Carrier

No

Shipper

No

Consignee

No

Reference Data

Material

Class and division (e.g., toxic by
inhalation, explosive, etc.)
Isolation zone

Shipper,
Consignee

Historical profiles - material
(e.g., materials, quantities,
carriers, consignees, etc.)

Carrier

Historical profiles - material
(e.g., materials, quantities,
carriers, consignees, routes,
etc.)

Yes

Available from Emergency Response
(ERG), material data sheets (MDS), etc.

Guide

Yes
No

No

Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time. Not
currently included in pilot system.

Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time. Not
currently included in pilot system.

Historical profiles - routes (e.g.,
planned vs. actual routes, fixed
vs. ad hoc, schedules.

No

Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time. Not
currently included in pilot system.

Driver

Background (e.g., experience,
citizenship, demographics,
criminal history)

No

Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time. Not
currently included in pilot system.

Hazmat Industry

Shipments patterns, statistics

Critical
Infrastructure

No

Population impact

No

Infrastructure impact

No

Can be developed by FDfolio™ over time. Not
currently included in pilot system.

Calculated by TEAMS and made available to
HTSS users but not communicated to FDfolio™.
This was simulated during a walkthrough
demonstration.

Nearby infrastructure provided by TEAMS
and made available to HTSS users but not
communicated to FDfolio™.
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1.11.4

The rules engine in FDfolio™ was populated with a set of simple
rules; future rules will provide deeper risk insight.

The HTSP operational deployment implemented a small set of rules in order to
demonstrate and test the risk-based concept. Figure 1.26 lists rules that were applied
during the HTSP program.

Figure 1.26 Future business rules for hazmat shipments

Rule

When Applied

FDfolio™ Action

Shipment-scorebaseline-commodityshipment

Shipment Initiation

FDfolio™ assigns risk score based on commodity

Shipment-unknowndriver

Shipment Initiation

Checks if the Driver is on the known driver list - gives score of 200 if
not.

Position report

Each UCI Event

No risk score change, positional data stored in database

Driver alarm

Each UCI Event

Increments score by 400 if driver alert UCI event is received

Vehicle hijack

Each UCI Event

Increments score by 500 if hijack UCI event is received.

Entered geo-fence

Each UCI Event

Increments score by 50 if exclusionary zone entry UCI event is received.

Exited geo-fence

Each UCI Event

Decrements score by 50 if exclusionary zone is exited UCI is received.

Each commodity consequence factor is managed independently. Default
commodity score is 100. Score can be changed via the UI.

These rules are only an initial sample of those that may eventually be applied. Much
greater risk management functionality can be built into a hazmat truck tracking systems
with a more extensive set of rules. Future rules will likely fall into one of the following
categories.


Cargo Analysis. Rules in this category consider the nature of the cargo being
shipped and assess risk inherent in this cargo (i.e., a risk score is assigned for each
material, additional rules can be added that are associated with a category of
materials)



Modal Analysis. Rules in this category assess risk associated with the shipment
mode, perhaps in combination with a particular chemical. For example, in the
HAZMAT truck situation compared to rail, a higher risk score could be assigned
because trucks can be driven to specific targets or because they are more
susceptible to a particular type of attack that may be expected based on available
intelligence.



Entity Analysis.
Rules in this category consider entities associated with a
shipment. For example, a particular consignee may be a source of concern based
on suspected association with terrorist groups.



Event Analysis. Rules in this category are associated with events. For example, a
driver alert or geo-fence violation is assigned pre-specified risk scores. This rule
category can look at larger picture issues such as patterns of events across a region
or a “swarming scenario” in which multiple shipments are brought together perhaps
as part of a coordinated attack.



Historical Analysis. This rule category considers the behavior of shipments
compared to historical behavior. For example, when a HAZMAT truck takes an
unusual route, follows an unusual schedule, or is carrying an unusual quantity or
mix of materials.



Consequence Analysis.
Rules in this category consider the potential
consequences associated with a particular cargo relative to its current location. For
example, a rule can be defined that might define a high risk score because the
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There are many types of
business rules that might be
developed for hazmat shipments.

chemical can be used as a weapon against population centers and the truck is traveling
through high population density areas.

1.11.5

Integration of a risk (business rules) engine into a tracking system
is feasible and will provide dynamic risk profiling of hazmat
shipments.

The HTSP experience proved that it is feasible to connect the standards-based UCI to a
risk-based filtering engine such as FDfolio™ to support near real-time risk assessments
of hazmat shipments.
The HTSP project team proved
that integrating a risk (business)
rules engine into a truck tracking
system is feasible and will meet
TSA’s objectives.

During the project, carrier events such as gate-out, position updates, and panic button
alerts were forwarded to FDfolio™ by the UCI and successfully processed to evaluate risk
level using a small sample of rules. Qualitative risk evaluation scores were returned to
TEAMS for display in near real-time. This ability of the UCI to support the required riskbased messaging was demonstrated using the operationally deployed HTSS pilot system.
The risk-based concept, as demonstrated, was analytically shown to reduce false alarms
and missed signals over the TEAMS-only approach. This conclusion was reached based
on a walkthrough demonstration and a comparative analysis of the ability of TEAMS with
and without risk-based support to detect categories of potential threat indicators. The
demonstration was based on an actual hazmat shipment that was modified to simulate
an evolving security threat situation. Watch list and historical data were simulated to
support the scenario.
The analytic comparison of TEAMS with and without risk-based support highlighted
several potential advantages of the risk-based approach. These advantages are derived
from 1). identification of risk factors not available from a TEAMS-only solution; 2).
better ability to consider patterns across multiple shipments; 3). reduced workload with
the risk-based approach; and 4). more confident decision-making. More work is needed
to develop and validate a more comprehensive rule set before these potential
advantages can be realized, however.
The FDfolio™ rules engine was effective in conducting near real-time risk assessments
using a small set of rules implemented during the tests. A test version of the HTSS was
employed to test FDfolio’s™ ability to process input event messages, evaluate risk
levels, and support operational tasks associated with the risk-based approach. In
addition to verifying the ability of the TEAMS – FDfolio™ integration to provide risk
evaluations associated with HAZMAT truck shipment events, these tests evaluated the
ability to “drill down” into FDfolio™ to access risk assessment details and rationale. It
was possible to accomplish the “drill down” to view specific rule firings and when
necessary disable rules “on-the-fly”. This capability is intended to support a threat
validation process. For example, if non-threatening reasons are found to explain
parameters interpreted as threatening the rules involved can be disabled. The tests also
verified that risk scores returned to TEAMS from FDfolio™ were consistent with rules
that were implemented. It was also possible to integrate new rules into FDfolio™ as
experience and evolving threat environments require.
While the feasibility and potential advantages of the risk-based approach were
demonstrated, the actual rules implemented were very limited in scope. A more
complete set of rules with improved data sources will need to be developed and
validated before all the potential advantages can be realized.
These conclusions were specific to the hazmat truck security problem. However, it is
notable that a rules-based approach to evaluating risks has been applied to other
domains.
For example, FDfolio™ has been applied to rail and air hazmat risk
assessment domains that involved assessing risks based on hazmat materials and
intelligence watch lists.

Valuable risk manager rules were
learned in the HTSP program.

1.11.6

Valuable risk management lessons were learned during the HTSP
project.

The following risk management lessons from the HTSP project were presented in the
final report.
1.

Knowledge of expected behavior is an important consideration. It is important to have a
baseline of expected behavior against which to evaluate hazmat truck actions and assess
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associated risk levels. These can be based on normal practice, historical norms for the industry
or the specific carrier, pre-planned routes, or regulations (e.g., regulations about travel within
high population areas).
2.

Variable update rate for truck location reporting can provide necessary resolution
when needed. As hazmat trucks approach locations that are vulnerable to the particular
hazmat being transported it will be necessary to increase the truck location update rate to
provide adequate resolution. By increasing the truck location reporting rate only when needed,
the costs associated with location reporting can be minimized at other times.

3.

Hazmat-specific risks are an important element of effective risk assessment. Different
hazmat loads are associated with different risks. The risk assessment approach therefore
considers the specific hazmat material being transported. For example, high population areas
are vulnerable to compressed gases and toxic materials (hazmat material classifications 2 and
6, respectively) while critical infrastructure is vulnerable to explosives, flammable liquids, and
flammables (hazmat material classifications 1, 3, and 4, respectively). Behaviors and risks are
evaluated based on the hazmat material being transported.

4.

Knowledge of truck contents is essential. In order to properly assess hazmat risks (as
noted above) it is essential that information about what the truck is carrying be made available.
The quantity of the material being carried is also important.

5.

Access to watch lists provide a valuable intelligence-based perspective . Watch lists
offer a potentially valuable adjunct to the risk assessment approach because they allow
consideration of intelligence information external to the shipment itself. The ability to take
advantage of watch lists, however, requires availability of the associated information from
carriers (e.g., to use a driver watch list it is necessary to obtain driver information from the
carrier).

6.

Things happen fast near targets. This is a major advantage of the risk-based approach, i.e.,
that risk-based predictions can provide early warnings. It is important to structure the riskbased approach in a way that provides adequate warning when potential risks occur to allow
time for effective actions to be performed. Also, this fact requires that decisions and actions be
taken quickly. A key objective of the risk-based approach is to provide early warning,
recommendations, and sufficient information about the risks to allow confident and timely
decisions. It is equally, important to minimize false alarms to the extent possible to avoid costly
and time-consuming responses to non-threats. This is also an objective to the risk-based
approach.

1.12

An emulator in the HTSP allowed users to “practice” using the HTSP
prototype.

The Emulator page, illustrated in Figure 1.27, allows TEAMS users with the appropriate
user account privileges to create test events in TEAMS. TEAMS users that do not have
Emulator access privileges will not see the Emulator navigation tab when using TEAMS.
The Emulator page contains a map that allows a user to enter an event’s location,
dropdown boxes to set an event’s type and status, an area to enter cargo information,
and an area to enter vehicle and driver data. Once this data is entered, a user can click
a button to create a single test message with the data that had been entered. The
Emulator also contains a section that allows a user to create an event that will update
automatically by entering a speed, heading, and update rate for the event. The
Emulator page also has tabs that a user can click on to navigate to the List View page,
Map View page, or Action Log View page.

Truck tracking center operators
can practice using the HTSP
prototype using the emulator to
simulate real events.

The HTSP contractor had to find alternate ways to get cargo data from carriers. One
approach involved the use of FDfolio™ to enter cargo data. Another approach was to
assign data to “fill in” missing data using a “data publisher.”
None of the approaches for capturing cargo data, however, involved the use of an
electronic manifest.
An electronic manifest would have provided an elegant and
functional solution to TSA’s needs for hazmat cargo information, especially if the solution
integrated with the Customs and Border Protection’s ACE Truck E-Manifest.

1.13 The HTSP project report suggested enhancements to the prototype.
In its final reports, the HTSP contractor listed a number of enhancements that it
expected would be included in an enhanced version of a hazmat truck tracking center.


Improve the TEAMS user interface by removing the Refresh List button. A graphical
component can still be used to flash to get the user’s attention in the case of a new
alert message being received but new data could be loaded into the list or the
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The HTSP project team
suggested numerous
enhancements to the prototype.

Figure 1.27 TEAMS emulator page

Automatically refresh events on
the TEAMS user interface – sort
the list based on risk to avoid
losing sight of important
shipments.

Enhance vehicle tracking.
 Increase truck location
frequency to at least every 15
minutes.

map without user interaction. This approach was not originally taken since the List View
is sorted by time and the development team felt that automatically loading the newest
event data to the top of the list would cause the rows in the list to continually ‘jump’
from the bottom to the top making it difficult for a user to focus on a row if new data
were being received at a high rate. One way to prevent this is to instead sort the list
based on risk level or on the internally generated TEAMS ID. If the data is sorted by risk
level, the most serious events will be shown at the top of the list for the user.


 Establish 2-way
communications with fleet
tracking vendors.
 Allow carriers to upload
electronic route plans.

Improve population at risk
calculation features.

Build features to allow shippers
to store information on future
shipments.
Redesign TEAMS alerting
functionality.

Make the UI more user friendly
by displaying the hierarchical
relationships between groups and
users.

Improve vehicle tracking.
o

Increase minimum vehicle location reporting interval to at least once every fifteen
minutes, with the capability to increase the frequency if events dictate.

o

Establish two-way communications with truck tracking systems to enable
automated requests for reporting rate adjustments.

o

Enhance geo-fencing capability to allow carrier software systems to upload their
origin, destination, and current routes.



Enhance population impact calculations by considering individual buildings rather
than simply calculating percentages of census tract data and considering time of
day.



Build the capability to accept information on planned shipments as well as active
shipments. Planned shipment information would provide analysts the capability to
preemptively make decisions on tracking or possibly canceling shipments.



Update TEAMS alerting logic. Most of TEAMS’ alerting functionality was not
anticipated originally, and a redesign might help identify ways to make it function
better.



Make the User Management graphical user interface more user-friendly so that it is
easier for users to determine the hierarchical relationships between groups and
users. One way of accomplishing this would be to replace the tables on the main
User Management page with a tree structure instead. The currently logged in user’s
group would be at the top of the tree with all of the subgroups listed underneath.
This type of structure would more accurately represent the hierarchical nature of
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the user accounts in TEAMS. The graphical user interface can also be further
enhanced by improving the processing time required to load the pages.


Tighten integration between TSA and the first responder community by developing
electronic data exchange integration capabilities with Computer Aided Dispatch
(CAD) systems. The first responders will receive incident information more quickly
than they do now and the TEAMS software can receive more detailed information
from the first responders when they arrive at the incident scene.
Many
communities currently have their own CAD systems and data messages can be
exchanged using the same 1512 format message that the UCI accepts.



Integrate voice over IP (VoIP) within the TEAMS application to allow users to make
voice calls over the internet from the TEAMS software rather than using a traditional
land-line telephone. One possible method of integration would be to use the API
offered by VoIP provider Skype. This API allows developers to utilize Skype’s
existing VoIP infrastructure in their own custom applications.



Improve material handling information:
o

Update the ERG database when the 2008 version of the ERG is released.

o

The isolation zone information is currently displayed as just a distance measure
and not contextually related to the event. The isolation information should be
graphically displayed using a map that would allow quick identification of any
points of interest that might be impacted by material.

o

The ability to perform plume modeling should be considered in conjunction with
the isolation zone information.

o

The material handling guides shown are just those related to the materials
associated with a given event. The operator should be provided with a means
to look up the information for any material, thus allowing for corrections if the
material reported is incorrect or no material is reported

Integrate TEAMS with Computer
Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems to
better support first responders
using the 1512 XML standards.

Integrate VOIP into TEAMS to
eliminate use of land-lines to
communicate with system users.

Improve hazmat information that
TEAMS relies on and passes onto
system users.



Update the map layers used by TEAMS once a year. Also, new vector map overlays
that are required by TSA should be added to the TEAMS GIS as needed. The
orthographic map capabilities can also be enhanced natively within the TEAMS GIS.
If possible, the Google Maps satellite imagery should be replaced with detailed
satellite imagery in the TEAMS ArcIMS map service. Doing so will require detailed
imagery tiles to be acquired for all of the United States and additional storage space
to accommodate all of this data. There may also be potentially significant software
modifications to optimize the performance of loading the detailed satellite imagery.
However, in the long run decoupling the TEAMS software from the Google Maps
service will be beneficial provided that Google may at any time discontinue third
parties from using their Google Maps API.



Establish a two way communications interface between the truck tracking software
packages and the TEAMS software to enable the automated increase of a truck’s
reporting rate. As the software works now, the same alert is created whether the
inner ring or the outer ring surrounding the event violates a geo-fence’s boundary.
After adding two way communications between the tracking software and TEAMS, a
geo-fence violation by the outer ring will not generate an alert to the TEAMS
operator but instead automatically increasing the reporting rate for that truck.
Then, if the inner ring penetrates a geo-fence’s boundary, a message will be
generated to alert the TEAMS operator. This will reduce the number of false alarms
that are created when the larger outer ring crosses a geo-fence boundary and
TEAMS operators will only have to manage events whose inner rings have caused a
geo-fence violation.

Establish a two-way
communications interface
between TEAMS and fleet
tracking vendors to enable
increased location reporting rate.

Allow carrier software systems to upload their current routes to TEAMS to make the
route adherence feature more feasible operationally. Although computing route
deviations is not a technically demanding task, the TEAMS operators may not be
familiar with the routes that specific trucks are required to adhere to and this is
where the difficulty lies in truly implementing route adherence. This task is best
done at the carrier since the route is often more familiar to the carrier’s staff. By
providing the functionality to allow the carrier to upload its routes to TEAMS and

Provide carriers the capability to
load route information into
TEAMS.
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Replace Google Maps imagery
with ArcIMS map service.

assign them to specific shipments, route adherence will become a useful feature of
TEAMS.
Provide functionality to allow
carriers to build a route using
start/end locations.



Add a feature to the geo-fence creation software that allows a TEAMS user to
compute a route by assigning a start location and an end location. This will allow a
TEAMS user to create a route without having to draw it using the free-form drawing
tools. If the carrier’s software does not possess the ability to create and transmit
routes to TEAMS, the carrier users can use this.



Enhance the estimated population impact feature by replacing census tract data
with house data. Houses will either be within the isolation zone of an event or
outside of the radius and there will no longer be the need to perform the percentage
of census tract estimate calculation. Further enhancements can include factoring
the local time into population impact calculations. Another data source will need to
be provided to TEAMS that will indicate population data in a particular location at
various times throughout the day. This data set can provide more accurate results
since some areas (like urban business districts) grow in population during the day
and shrink in population at night. Advanced plume model analysis can also be used
to deliver even more accurate population impact estimates. This would include
factoring in weather data to the calculation to determine weather, wind speed, and
wind direction which will affect how a chemical spreads when released into the
environment. In its current implementation the population impact calculation
assumes that the chemical will spread in a perfect circle around the truck.



Enhance the emulator to provide a full featured data entry page for use by certain
TEAMS users. A full featured data entry page will provide the ability to generate
live messages that will be sent to the UCI rather than only the test messages sent
by the emulator. This enhancement will be useful to participating hazmat carriers
that can not automatically generate gate out and gate in messages to send to the
UCI. These carriers will be able to login to the TEAMS data entry page and enter
information about their trucks and when they are scheduled to depart for their
shipments. When the scheduled shipment time elapses, a gate out message can be
sent to the UCI and an event will be created in the TEAMS system. Subsequent
updates to this event will occur when tracking data is correlated with the event
using the truck information. These carriers that use TEAMS for manual data entry
will also have access to TEAMS so that they can monitor and track their fleet
through the TEAMS software.



Enhance in-house truck tracking center training capability.

Enhance the population impact
feature of TEAMS by basing
calculations on house data rather
than census tract data.

Provide a messaging capability
for carriers via the UCI. Provide
user access to TEAMS so that
carriers can monitor their fleets.

Enhance training functionality.

Add internal system messaging
as a safety net to ensure that
external alerts receive proper
response.

Build functionality to improve
cargo data input. Replace
FDfolio as the mechanism for
data input.

o

Build a separate system for controlled training to avoid burdening the live and
test systems.

o

Build a VoiceXML application to replicate TSA and PSAP responses in a training
exercise.

o

Build an analysis tool to evaluate operator performance in handling the
simulated events. By analyzing the time statistics for each operator’s reaction
to the simulated events, it can determine who needs additional training and
more efficiently allocate our available training resources.



Provide an external alert (email message, SMS message, etc.) to TSA when an
event is not acknowledged by the truck tracking center after a certain time
threshold. For example, if an event remains unacknowledged for more than one
minute, an email can be sent to TSA brining their attention to this event. This will
add an extra layer of notification to help ensure that an actual transportation event
does not go undetected by TSA.



Build a better cargo data interface.
o

Build a cargo data entry application that is explicitly designed for the purpose of
tracking hazardous materials. Provide interface information to shippers and
carriers so that they may use their existing systems to submit cargo data to the
truck tracking center.

o

Discourage the use of FDfolio or similar applications for entering gate-out and
gate-in events. The reason for this is that using such an application requires an
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operator at the carrier facility to reliably enter the events. A far better solution
is using the tracking vendor systems to have the driver create the events.




Increase the performance and message rate of the HTSP prototype.
o

Increase the speed of PSAP contact information retrieval.

o

Use ArcSDE instead of ArcIMS for PSAP contact queries. ArcSDE is a Spatial
Database Engine that allows shapefiles to be stored in a relational database and
queried against and is designed to perform high performance geospatial
queries.

o

Display PSAP Details Page Data on a map. Adding a map to this page showing
the PSAP boundaries in addition to the textual descriptions of the PSAP contact
information will be a more complete solution for a TEAMS user. Also, providing
the functionality to allow a TEAMS user to make notes about a particular PSAP
may be a useful feature. For example, a TEAMS user can make notes about
whether or not the PSAP has internet access allowing access to TEAMS or who
they spoke with regarding an event. This data could then be retrieved by any
user during future communications with this PSAP.

o

TEAMS should be optimized to improve message throughput and user interface
performance. To improve throughput, the database storage and geospatial
data lookup processes can both be optimized. Performance tuning the Oracle
database will increase the speed in which data is written to the database. By
implementing a Spatial Database Engine (SDE) rather than performing data
queries on a map feature layer service will increase the speed in which
geospatial data is queried.

o

Improve user interface processing speed by replacing many of the JavaServer
Faces components with more basic HTML components.

o

Improve performance by using partial page refreshes using the Asynchronous
JavaScript and XML (AJAX) web programming technique. Instead of requiring
an entire page refresh when new data is requested, AJAX will allow a partial
refresh of only the data that needs updating considerably improving load time
from the user’s perspective. For instance, when zooming in on the map, only
the map portion of the page should be refreshed, not the entire page. Some of
these concepts are applied throughout the geo-fence designer pages and can
be applied throughout the entire TEAMS application.

o

Tune Java Virtual Machine (JVM) Heap allocations. The fact that the average
CPU load was observed to increase and decrease significantly under a constant
message rate indicates that other processes were occupying the CPU time in a
less than optimal way. A likely process is memory allocation and garbage
collection within the JVM. The JVM heap sizes can be tuned to reduce these
peak loads on the CPU and allow for more processing resources for the
application.

o

Tune the Thread Pools and Connection Pools. Similar to the JVM heap, thread
pools and connection pools can be optimized for the application.

o

Tune the Oracle database. Access by the application to the database is through
the Hibernate persistence and query service. This makes measuring the time
required for this access difficult to measure at the application level. However
tuning the Oracle database to the loads may increase performance.

o

Increase number of processors. After the steps outlined above are addressed,
more processor will need to be added to increase the number of truck that can
be tracked by the TTCP. The first step may be to run the TEAMS Map server
(ArcIMS) on separate dedicated server. Currently it shares a server which
hosts the web pages. Also the TEAMS web service and the Oracle database
could be hosted on separate servers. Beyond that, clustering of the JBoss
Application servers and the Oracle database need to be evaluated.

Use ArcSDE to reduce the computational time needed to retrieve geographic
information relative to an incident’s current location. Currently the ArcIMS product
is used to retrieve this information. Although ArcIMS provides this feature, the
main role of ArcIMS is to render map images for display on a user interface not to
do geo-processing. The optimal product to use for geospatial information retrieval
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Increase performance and
messaging capabilities of the
technology prototype.

Use ESRI ArcSDE for geo-spatial
data processing/display.

is ArcSDE. The main function of ArcSDE is to do geo-processing tasks such as
reverse geo-coding and points of interest lookup. Using ArcSDE instead of ArcIMS
to accomplish these tasks will greatly improve the overall performance of TEAMS,
especially in a large scale deployment environment where multiple data messages
are arriving each second.

Enhance TEAMS so that users
can manage multiple events –
Option 1: multiple windows in
the web browser.

Provide TEAMS users with a more efficient way to manage multiple events.
o

Option one is to provide a user interface that allows multiple ‘windows’ to be
open within one web browser window that will be more like a ‘desktop’ that a
web page. This option will provide the TEAMS user with a list of all of the
events just as the current version does. However, when viewing an event’s
details the user will not be required to navigate to a new page. Instead of
navigating to a separate page, the list will remain visible to the user and a new
‘window’ will be shown that displays the selected event’s detailed information.
Multiple ‘windows’ can be opened at once and each can be dragged, resized,
minimized, or closed. This will allow the user to view multiple events at any
one time but the interface may become cluttered and confusing if many event
details ‘windows’ are open at once.

o

Option two is to provide an expanded List View that displays additional data.
This option will be a much less radical change than the previous option utilizing
a ‘desktop’ and ‘windows’. In this option, the List View will essentially look the
same in its initial state but there will be an arrow icon at the beginning of each
row. The TEAMS user may click on this icon to show more data for the selected
event without navigating to the full Event Details page. When the arrow is
clicked, the row in the table will expand downward and more data will be
revealed to the user. This data will include a map of the event’s location (either
using Google Maps or the TEAMS native ArcIMS service), the first contact
information, and Emergency Response Guide data, as well as other data that is
identified as this idea is developed. A similar functionality can be added to the
Map View page that will allow for the dynamic loading of event details in a
portion of the Map View page rather than navigating to the Event Details page.
All of these user interface updates and the associated data retrieval will be
developed using AJAX techniques so that no page refreshes will occur and the
data loading will appear fluid to the user.

o

Option three is to create a ‘dashboard’ start page with capabilities expanding
upon the original List View page. The overview data would still be shown in a
list format but an overview map will also be visible on the ‘dashboard’ page.
This will provide an integrated view for the user showing both the list and the
map simultaneously. The list will also have the data expansion feature as
described above but the map portion will not be displayed in each row.
Instead, when the TEAMS user expands the list data for the event, that event’s
icon will be highlighted on the overview map. This will allow the TEAMS user to
see how any of the selected events geographically relate to each other on a
single map. The ‘dashboard’ will initially show the user events with risk scores
higher than low risk but filter options will be available natively on the
‘dashboard’ allowing the user to modify the view as desired without requiring
an entire page refresh.

Enhance TEAMS so that users
can manage multiple events –
Option 2: expanded List View.

Enhance TEAMS so that users
can manage multiple events –
Option 3: dashboard start page.


Enhance management
capabilities of TEAMS to support
multiple events.

Modify the TEAMS management approach to improve the ability of TEAMS to handle
multiple events simultaneously.
o

Filter out position reports and normal shipments by default so that the TEAMS
operators are not overwhelmed with information.

o

Add the ability for a TEAMS “manager” to assign resolution of a specific incident
to a specific operator on duty.

o

Provide the TEAMS “manager” with a high level overview of all incidents
currently in progress to monitor the status of their resolution by the operators.

o

Provide the feature allowing a TEAMS operator can take control of an incident if
it hasn’t been assigned to another operator yet. This will help reduce any
potential bottlenecks of requiring a “manager” to be in the loop of any incident
resolution.
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o

Provide a TEAMS feature that will group incidents that are occurring within the
same geographic region. One TEAMS operator can then coordinate with one
PSAP call taker about multiple incidents.
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2.0

Independent Verification
erification & Validation Review of the
HTSP Technology Prototype 1

The U.S. Transportation Security Administration employed an independent verification
and validation (IV&V) contractor to evaluate the HTSP technology prototype.
The goal of the IV&V effort was to assess if the HTSP technology prototype satisfied
program requirements,
s, whether system performance and technical benchmarks were
met, and if additional requirements needed to be met in an operational truck tracking
system.

The U.S. Transportation Security
Administration employed an
independent verification and
validation contractor to evaluate
the HTSP technology prototype.

The IV&V process implemented on this project
p
by the Evaluation Team was based on
industry accepted IV&V
V approaches to analyze and evaluate software and IT applications
and operational testing programs. For the HTSP Prototype system, the Evaluation Team
conducted two types of IV&V testing: (1) technical system verification and validation,
and (2) evaluation of operations of the HTSP Prototype system.
syst
The Evaluation Team
also evaluated stakeholder/user issues with the HTSP.

2.1
.1 The IV&V contractor identified HTSP technology prototype system defects.
In the area of technical system verification, the Evaluation Team identified 23 system
defects. Figure 2.1 summarizes all the identified defects based on the five defined
categories and their associated severity levels, based on High, Medium, or Low levels.
levels

Figure 2.1.
.1. Summary of Technical IV&V Testing Results
Severity Level

Functionality

User
Interface

System
Performance

System
Security

Regression

Total

High

1

0

2

2

0

5

Medium

3

1

0

1

0

5

Low

5

6

0

1

1

13

Total
(Percentage)

9
(39%)

7
(30%)

2
(9%)

4
(17%)

1
(4%)

23
(100%)

Following are brief descriptions of the most serious of these identified system defects:



Functional Defects: Based on the testing results, the geo-fencing
geo
functionality is
not reliable. For example, events that are supposed to trigger geo-fence
geo
violations
did not trigger alerts. Events that are linked to a “cleared, removed” geo-fences still
incorrectly appear as “entered geo-fence.”
geo



System Performance: Two factors significantly slowed down system
performance― slow TEAMS response time and the inadequate speed of the map
refresh function.



System Security: Unlike typical,
al, password-protected
password
web-based systems, the
HTSP system does not time out after a certain amount of idle time. Additionally,
web-based
based systems do not typically store user identification (ID) and password
information on the local machine.

1

The IV&V contractor identified
three types of defects in the
HTSP technology prototype:
 Functional defects
 System performance defects
 System security defects

This section is taken from the Executive Summary (May 27, 2008) Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP); U.S.
Transportation Security Administration, Transportation Sector Network Management, Highway and Motor Carrier
Programs Office; pages 12-23.
23. The Executive
Executive Summary was published by TSA as part of its Grant Guidance and
Application Kit for TSA FY2009 Trucking Security Program.
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/grants/
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/grants/programs/tsp/2009/guidance_application.shtm
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Despite the above system and operations issues, the HTSP Prototype effort
demonstrated that the concept for HTSP was feasible and realistic. The testing further
highlighted the successful implementation of the non-proprietary Universal
Communications Interface set of protocols that will allow alerts and tracking information
to be transmitted from all commercially available tracking systems to a prototype truck
tracking center (TTC) and a 24-hour Government intelligence operations center.

HTSP staged events were used to
identify operational defects in the
HTSP technology prototype.

2.2 The IV&V contractor conducted staged events testing to identify HTSP
operational issues.
The evaluation team conducted 92 staged events during operational testing. Eight
motor carriers, with 124 power units, and 4 different tracking vendors participated in the
operational testing. The Evaluation Team conducted the tests between September and
December 2007. Operational testing consisted of 46 panic alert events and 46 geofence violations, either exclusionary or inclusionary. Figure 2.2 below shows a TEAMS
view of a panic button alert test conducted by the Evaluation Team.
Figure 2.2. TEAMS Details View Page Showing a Driver Alarm.

As part of the testing approach, staged events were established to assess the timeliness
and quality of information transfers between the tracked trucks, participating motor
carriers, and the Rural Metro operators (acting as the TTC watch standers and
representatives from TSA).
Three different staged events were used during the testing: (1) panic alert; (2)
exclusionary geo-fence; and (3) inclusionary geo-fence2. The events were triggered by
drivers in the field or dispatchers located in motor carrier facilities through activation of
a panic button, or by violating an established parameter of a geo-fence. For the staged
event testing, an exclusionary geo-fence is a defined boundary that a truck must remain
2

Other attack scenarios can certainly be envisioned beyond those tested, including attempts to mask the GPS
signal and then commandeer a truck, attempts to remove HAZMAT cargo from a trailer or tank, or theft of an
entire trailer or tank without disruption to the power unit. However, such scenarios were deemed to be outside of
the scope of the initial pilot deployment and will be addressed in subsequent tasks of this study.
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outside of, whereas an inclusionary geo-fence is one in which the truck must remain within.
The staged event testing process proved problematic, and significant system problems
were identified. Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the types of problems and the level
to which they affected the staged event testing.
Figure 2.3. Frequency of Problems/Issues Occurring During Staged Event Testing
Number
of GeoFence
Violation
Alerts

Number
of
Panic
Alerts

Total
Combined
Alerts

Applicable
Number of
Staged
Events

Percentage
of Staged
Events
Affected

The TTC did not receive or respond to
alerts.

21

5

26

92

28

TTC was unable to maintain current or
multiple carrier contact information.

5

8

13

92

14

TTC watch stander was unable to identify
the specific truck generating an alert to the
carriers.

20

32

52

92

57

Interpretation of carrier macros to open up
a trip, know what the cargo is, and
respond to an alert.

19

3

22

92

24

Carriers contacted multiple times for the
same event as though a new event had
occurred.

1

2

3

92

3

The TTC was overloaded by multiple
staged events in short succession.

1

1

2

3

67

Problem/Issue

The results from the table indicate that two of the problems/issues encountered during
the staged event testing occurred in more than 50 percent of the applicable staged
events: (1) the TTC was overloaded by multiple staged events in short succession; and
(2) the TTC watch stander was unable to identify the specific truck generating an alert to
the carriers.
The results also indicate that two of the problems/issues occurred in approximately 25
percent of the applicable staged events: (1) the TTC did not receive or respond to alerts;
and 2) interpretation of carrier macros to open up a trip, know what the cargo is, and
respond to an alert.
For the portion of the test operations in TEAMS developed by the Evaluation Team that
did work successfully in TEAMS, the Evaluation Team focused on measuring the system
operational performance of the TTC Response Timeline to a potential security incident.
This timeline is a function of: (1) the time to detect the alert through TEAMS; (2) the
time to establish communications with the TSA Watch Officer; and the (3) time to
contact the carrier to verify the nature of the alert. Due to the limited data set, this
assessment, which included the application of Monte Carlo Simulation, resulted in the
following key findings:



Mean elapsed time of 8 minutes to complete the TTC Response Timeline for panic
button alerts.



Mean elapsed time of 16 minutes to complete the TTC Response Timeline for geofence violation alerts.
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These findings illustrate that the mean time for both alert types (panic button and geofence) was 12 minutes. Based on feedback from the law enforcement community, the
time period of up to 12 minutes to confirm an incident and declare a TSI is significantly
longer than what would be considered effective for interdiction of a truck, especially in
an urban setting. Therefore, a future architecture and Concept of Operations needs to
consider that the nearest PSAP or other appropriate incident management lead agency,
have access to the alert and receive the same TTC information for alerts at the same
time that the TTC receives it. This approach will increase the likelihood that various first
responders could respond in a coordinated effort, thereby positioning units to interdict
as soon as TSA would declare a TSI.
While the above findings and issues point out to the immaturity of the HTSP system, the
testing effort nevertheless demonstrated that a centralized TTC could accept carrier
tracking data and respond to panic alerts generated by carriers, as well as alerts
resulting from carrier violation of TTC-established geo-fence boundaries.

2.3
The IV&V contractor evaluated stakeholder/user acceptance of the
technology prototype.
The Evaluation Team’s approach to assessing stakeholder and user acceptance and
review of the HTSP system involved active engagement and follow-up with a diverse set
of public and private sector groups, including the following:



Public Sector: TSA; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC); Department of Defense (DoD); Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA); Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA); Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance (CVSA); Military District of Washington, D.C.; and Regional/State Law
Enforcement (LE) Agencies, Fire Departments, Emergency Management (EM)
Agencies, State Transportation Agencies, Hazardous Material/Environmental
Agencies, and Academic Institutions.



Private Sector: Motor Carriers; Hazardous Materials Manufacturers and Suppliers;
Vehicle Immobilization Technology (VIT) Vendors; Satellite Tracking Vendors;
Satellite Communications Providers; Trucking Industry Association; and other
private companies.

The IV&V contractor evaluated
user acceptance of the HTSP
technology prototype.

The Evaluation Team conducted one live and three static demonstrations of the TTC
concept to collect information and data from potential HTSP users. The demonstrations
took place in Virginia, California, and Washington. The demonstrations used a scripted
scenario involving a truck carrying hazardous materials deviating from its assigned
route, causing an alert, and prompting the involvement of the TTC, TSA, motor carrier,
emergency dispatch, and first responders. The scenario developed into a transportation
security incident (TSI), and the TTC facilitated collaboration among the responding
agencies and provided access to the HTSP system. The scenario came to a successful
conclusion when law enforcement intercepted and stopped the truck.
Immediately following each demonstration session, the audience members participated
in focus group or question and answer sessions to assess and document participants’
views on the materials and demonstration. Based on the results of these sessions, the
Evaluation Team developed a set of focused findings for both the public and private
sectors across the following four areas:


ConOps should be changed to
provide direct support to first
responders in the field.

Concept of Operation (ConOps) Issues: The current ConOps relies on the TTC
and its ability to facilitate an appropriate response once an alert is received through
TEAMS. Several first responders feel TSA should not attempt to assist in managing
emergency response using the TTC capabilities, but rather through the TTC, provide
first responders with requested information on the hazmat load and the truck
carrying it. The first responders also noted that the concept does not appear to
readily allow information and data to be passed from law enforcement personnel in
the field to the TTC. A major concern of the first responders is that the concept’s
protocol, as it is currently designed, results in a process that is too slow, does not
involve local responders quickly enough, or provide them the information they need

44

to respond quickly and in a manner safest to the public at large. However, the idea
of the TTC notifying jurisdictions and maintaining contact with responders as long as
necessary, and in providing all contacted parties with a call-back number in the
event more information or assistance is needed also is well received.





Other Operational Issues: One issue raised with the HTSP notification process in
that there is no national consistency/standard with the protocol as it is currently
designed; there would need to be actual mapping of the emergency response
communications network at a national level. There also is concern that the action
model does not conform to National Incident Management System (NIMS) or
National Response Plan (NRP) (now the National Response Framework as of January
2008); does not use common terminology for incident management; and would not
allow for all the needed transportation agencies or organizations at the State and
county level to be involved. Some stakeholders also feel that law enforcement at
the Federal and State levels should be much more involved in either leading the
day-to-day management of the HTSP system or being the first to receive the alert
notifications. Additionally, one of the more prevalent operational concerns from the
first responders and transportation organizations and agencies involves testing the
capacity of the HTSP system to handle multiple alerts and/or incidents
simultaneously, and the number of false alarms that the system receives in an
alert-rich environment.
Regulatory Issues: One of the most significant issues, and one that warrants
further investigation, is how the HTSP program will integrate with other Federal
agency programs that regulate hazardous materials. The USDOT, Department of
Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DoD), and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) are all involved in regulating, in some fashion, the security and
safety of hazardous material manufacture, movement, and disposition. Where the
HTSP program fits in the scheme of regulatory requirements and how information
and data will be exchanged to leverage capabilities is a public sector concern. Also
of concern are information sharing and personnel security. Public Law 110-53,
‘‘Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,’’ more
commonly known as the “9/11 Bill,” requires TSA to develop a program to track the
shipments of certain groups or classes of material in a particular amount or form
known as “security-sensitive material” (S-SM). The collaborative process for the
HTSP program ConOps involves many “actors” and the concern focuses on how
cargo information and data involving S-SM will be protected as it is exchanged.

For private sector motor carriers the key issue appears to be whether or not
participation in the HTSP program will be compulsory or voluntary when it is
implemented. Several questions that were raised included that if participation becomes
compulsory, what is the anticipated number of motor carriers who will be in the
program, the number of loads that will be impacted, what specific data that will be
required, and what type of costs were envisioned for the carrier industry associated with
participation. Liability is also of concern, as well determining who will be responsible
when damage to equipment or injury to personnel occur as a result of or relating to an
alert, false alarm, or incident.
Motor carriers who participated in the HTSP Staged Event testing had mixed feelings
overall about the usefulness of the HTSP system. Most were very satisfied with their
current security equipment and technology used in performing operations; however, not
all were as satisfied that the equipment and technology made all of their shipments
secure. Regarding the HTSP system process of information dissemination during the
staged event testing, most of the motor carriers were satisfied; however, others cited
dissatisfaction with presentation of information, usefulness of information, and
completeness of information. Regarding the HTSP system procedures for information
dissemination during staged event testing, there were varying levels of satisfaction for
the motor carriers; however, others cited dissatisfaction with clarity of information from
the TTC, completeness of information from the TTC, and consistency of being contacted
by the TTC.

2.4 IV&V Conclusions and Recommendations
Figure 2.4 summarizes the conclusions and recommendations of the IV&V contractor.
The purpose of the recommendations as stated by the IV&V contractor was to…
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The technology prototype does
not conform to the National
Incident Management System.

TSA’s truck tracking center
should integrate with other
federal systems that hold hazmat
data and/or provide some type of
tracking capability.

“… provide input concerning the future direction of the HTSP program, including the
future full deployment of HTSP and TTC technologies in the United States.”

Figure 2.4. IV&V Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions

Corresponding Recommendations



The HTSP test successfully demonstrated the
potential of TTC technologies and standards,
including the use of the Universal
Communications Interface (UCI).



The high-level TTC concept, which incorporates UCI
technologies, should be a cornerstone of the future
deployment of the HTSP system.



The HTSP test proved the concept that a
centralized TTC could accept carrier tracking
data and respond to panic alerts generated by
carriers as well as alerts resulting from carrier
violation of TTC-established geo-fence
boundaries.



While the basic concepts of panic alert information
provided to and process by a TTC was validated,
additional and significant system re-design will be
required to improve the functional reliability of these
processes.



The HTSP Prototype system had significant
technical performance issues that would need
to be addressed before moving to a full-scale
system.



In addition to addressing overall system reliability and
security issues, the system architecture itself should be
significantly revised so that the sluggish system user
response issues are corrected; current state-of-the-art
technology relating to Web information management
software and Web mapping techniques should be
leveraged.



The HTSP Prototype system approach to geofencing will need significant rework to support
a credible TTC operational capability



The current geo-fencing software and operational
approach in the HTSP Prototype system should be
scrapped. The HTSP Program should investigate the
state-of-the-art in geo-fencing applications to identify/
develop a more robust geo-fencing approach for the
future deployed HTSP system.



HTSP Staged Event Testing showed a
substantial series of system operational
problems related to alert notification and TTC
communication issues.



The significant HTSP Prototype system errors in alert
notification highlights the need for the HTSP program to
re-evaluate the current system architecture and ConOps.
The errors further underscore the need to establish a
formal system engineering and design approach that will
ensure the development of a more reliable HTSP system
in the near future, as TSA moves forward with deploying
a fully operational HTSP system.



Challenges in tracking cargo
(trailers/containers) versus power units (truck
cabs) remain.



The HTSP program should investigate the current
trucking industry deployments of Untethered Trailer
Tracking (UTT) systems. These systems would have the
advantage of allowing a future HTSP system to track both
power units and trailers.



As currently designed, the HTSP Prototype
system has significant deficiencies in fulfilling
expected first responder requirements.



The HTSP program should establish high-level
requirements, possibly through a series of regional
“requirements workshops” in each of the Nation’s major
regions designed to meet congressionally mandated
program requirements, while at the same time
accommodating the needs and requirements of all
stakeholders.
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Conclusions

Corresponding Recommendations



As currently designed, the HTSP Prototype
system does not adequately take into account:
(1) how it would integrate with other
government security programs and tracking
systems; and (2), how it would integrate with
established state/local emergency response
systems.



Consideration should be given to how this system “fits in”
with other systems that are currently in use: (1)
determine the impact that the system has on other
systems, as well as how it is impacted by other HAZMATrelated Federal regulations and programs; (2) investigate
the functional redundancy and uniqueness of TTC
operations as related to other tracking programs’
operations; and (3), evaluate how the HTSP system could
be effectively integrated with other Geographic
Information System (GIS)-based emergency response
systems.



As currently designed, the HTSP Prototype
system does not provide the flexibility to
accommodate established Law Enforcement/
Emergency Response standards and practices
as well as jurisdictional uniqueness.



The following three steps should be considered here: (1)
align the system with the NIMS and National Response
Framework; (2) ensure the system is adaptable to
regional communications protocol, terminology, dispatch
procedures, etc.; and (3), establish understandings and
agreements with intelligence agencies, fusion centers,
and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) that help to
coordinate correct information transfer.



The benefit-cost assessment showed that the
system could be deployed by TSA, and initial
operations could begin for a budget in the
range of $20 million for TSA, which resulted in
a significantly positive benefit-cost case for the
public sector. However, despite a credible
benefit-cost case for motor carriers to deploy
the technologies, substantial private sector
investment would nevertheless be required to
implement the necessary tracking systems.



If a Federal mandate for motor carriers to deploy HTSP
technologies is not feasible, then TSA should consider
innovative strategies that can leverage the deployment of
the HTSP tracking technologies, such as: (1) lower
insurance premiums due to reduced levels of risk and
improved safety from improved incident detection and
response capabilities; and (2) the creation of a
deployment incentive tax credit program for the motor
carrier industry, vendors, and manufacturers.



To support real-time position tracking, the
HTSP system may need to receive position
reports significantly more frequently (perhaps
every 15-30 minutes) than the current
industry standard of one report about every 2
hours. The additional cost to TSA and/or TSA
of this more frequent position-reporting
requirement will be measured in the high tens
of million dollars annually.



Additional investigation is required to assess methods of
optimizing position reporting based on HAZMAT load type,
threat, and consequence information; such optimization
has the potential to save TSA and/or industry tens of
millions of dollars annually in potentially unneeded
communications costs.
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3.0

Gaps Between the HTSP Technology Prototype
P
and
a Tier
er 1 HSSM Truck Tracking System

This section expands on the IV&V
V analysis of the HTSP technology prototype with a more
in-depth
depth look at the gap between the technology prototype and an operational Tier 1
HSSM truck tracking system.
It is important to note that the scope of the HTSP project focused on proving that a
hazmat truck tracking center was technically feasible and that “smart truck” technology
could be crafted into an effective and efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments. It
took place before the 9/11 Act directed the TSA Administrator to develop a program to
facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments of security-sensitive
security
materials. It also
was completed before TSA advanced the outlines
outl
of a regulatory strategy for Tier 1
Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs) by issuing voluntary Security Action Items
(SAIs) for Tier 1 HSSMs.

The IV&V contractor evaluated
the HTSP technology prototype.

The objective of the HTSP project
was to prove that a hazmat truck
tracking center was technically
feasible.

Appendix B describes TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM SAIs, and describes the elements of a
regulatory program based
d on Tier 1 HSSM SAI implementation.
As illustrated in Figure 1.2 on page 3,, the HTSP project team began its work in October
2005. It had to make basic assumptions about the regulatory context in which a hazmat
truck tracking program might operate,
operate and this factored significantly into design
decisions made by the project team.. For example, the team could not assume that TSA
regulations would drive “smart truck” technology deployment and data reporting, or that
hazmat carriers might be obligated to deploy untethered trailer tracking or vehicle
immobilization systems.

The HTSP project was completed
before TSA issued its Tier 1
HSSM Security Action Item
guidance.

Many
any of the “gaps” between the technology prototype and an operational Tier 1 HSSM
truck tracking system are due to TSA programmatic developments that took place after
the HTSP pilot program ended.
It’s important to stress that the
he analysis in this section should not be viewed as a
negative reflection on the TSA HTSP project or the HTSP technology prototype.
The
TSA HTSP pilot project conclusively met its objective in demonstrating that “smart truck”
technology
echnology could be crafted into an effective and efficient system for tracking hazmat
shipments. Because of the HTSP program, TSA is now able to state with confidence that
implementation of a regulatory program with a hazmat truck tracking system at its heart
h
is completely viable.

The HTSP project was hugely
successful in that it proved that a
hazmat truck tracking center is
feasible from a technology
perspective.

It should also be noted that the HTSP project team identified many improvements it
believed should be made to the technology prototype (refer to Section 1.13, page 33).
A number of those recommendations are factored into the analysis under this section.
Also, in addition to fully meeting
ing HTSP contract objectives the project team’s
development of the Universal Communications Interface (UCI) was a particularly notable
accomplishment. With only minor modification, the UCI can be
b incorporated into an
operational Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system.
This section identifies “gaps” between the HTSP technology pilot an operational Tier 1
HSSM truck tracking system.

3.1

The HTSP technology prototype
was not built to support a Tier 1
HSSM regulatory program based
on Security Action Item
compliance.



TSA Tier 1 HSSM guidance was issued June 2008 – after
completion of the TSA HTSP project.



The technology pilot was not designed with Security Action
Item compliance in mind.



Much of the functionality needed to support a Tier 1 HSSM
Security Action Item compliance program is not built into
the technology pilot.
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3.2

3.3

3.4

Outdated and/or underpowered
tools (GIS, collaboration, web
services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype.

The technology prototype’s alert
notification and communications
functions
were
degrade
degraded
by
architectural design flaws.

The
concept
of
operations
underlying the HTSP technology
prototype
was
flawed
and
substantially incomplete and did
not reflect the critical role of states
and other parties in securing the
hazmat supply chain.



Refer to Appendix B – SAIs of particular note where
supporting functionality is lacking or inadequate – SAI#9,
SAI#13, SAI#17, SAI#18, SAI#21, SAI#22, SAI#23



Less capable versions of ESRI GIS software was used to
build the technology prototype limiting functionality and
efficiency of the application.



Collaboration options in the technology prototype were
limited.
There was too much reliance on telephone
communication in the HTSP concept of operations.



The IV&V contractor documented significant system
syst
errors in
alert notification highlighting the need to re-evaluate
re
the
current system architecture and concept of operations.



The errors detected in the technology prototype testing
underscored the need to establish a formal system
engineering/design
design
approach
that
will
ensure
the
development of a more reliable operational system.



Only one business process was developed in the HTSP – a
driver panic button alert. Many more are needed (see 3.8).
The concept of operations plan focused on this alert being
distributed to a local public safety answering point (PSAP)1
for action, bypassing
ng state fusion centers.



Hazardous materials management is a state-delegated
state
program. In most states, the states – not DOT or TSA – are
responsible for the direct regulation and oversight of hazmat
carriers. Bypassing state authorities to reach down directly
to a PSAP will create
e a serious state/federal relationship
issue. Also, with the development of state fusion centers
throughout the nation, states and state fusion centers are a

1

Wikipedia defines a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) as a call center responsible for answering calls to an emergency
telephone number for police, firefighting,, and ambulance services. Trained telephone operators are also usually responsible for
dispatching these emergency services.. Most PSAPs are now capable of caller location for landline calls, and many can handle mobile
phone locations as well, where the mobile phone company has a handset location system.. Some can also use voice broadcasting,
where outgoing voice mail can be sent to many phone numbers at once, in order to alert people to a local emergency such as a
chemical spill.
In the United States, the county or a large city usually handles this responsibility. As a division of a U.S. state,
state counties are
generally bound to provide this and other emergency services even within the municipalities,, unless the municipality chooses to opt
out and have its own system, sometimes along with a neighboring jurisdiction.. If a city operates its own PSAP, but not its own
particular emergency service (for example, city police but county fire), it may be necessary to relay the call to the PSAP that does
handle that type of call. The U.S. requires caller location capability on the part of all phone companies,, including mobile ones, but
there is no federal law requiring PSAPs to be able to receive such information.
There are roughly 6100 primary and secondary PSAPs in the U.S.. Personnel working for PSAPs can
can become voting members of the
National Emergency Number Association (NENA). Emergency dispatchers working in PSAPs can become certified with the National
Academies of Emergency Dispatch (NAED),
AED), and a PSAP can become an NAED Accredited Center of Excellence.
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better coordination point for initial contact in a
transportation security incident.
They have more capable
systems and communications capabilities than local PSAPs.

3.5

3.6

The HTSP technology prototype
relied too heavily on the Universal
Communications Interface to bring
data into the TEAMS application.

The technology prototype did not
employ an electronic manifest
solution that would allow it to
efficiently accept load, driver, &
shipment information.



There is a need to drive business processes down to the local
PSAP in the event of a transportation security incident (see
3.25 and 3.26), but the business processes for doing so
should flow through state fusion centers.



The IEEE 1512 standards-based Universal Communications
Interface (UCI) is an efficient, standards-based mechanism
for data intake from fleet tracking vendors.



Section 1.4 provides an overview of the UCI. Appendix A
provides links to detailed design documents for the UCI.



The IEEE 1512 standard was developed to support a wide
range of data exchange needs related to hazmat shipments,
and hazmat incidents/response.
Not all of these data
elements were needed to support the HTSP program.



Hazmat carriers and fleet tracking vendors used the UCI to
report data to the technology prototype. Two key pieces of
data passed through the UCI – vehicle location and driver
panic button alerts. Other data originating from carrier
truck-mounted systems will need to flow through the UCI,
and the IEEE 1512 standard supports this data flow. This
includes alerts from untethered tracking system devices,
vehicle immobilization systems, and electronic lock/seals.
The incremental cost for additional data reporting from these
systems via the UCI is negligible.



The HTSP technology prototype attempted to use the UCI as
the mechanism to capture data on the type and quantity of
materials in hazmat shipments. While the UCI could be
engineered to support this mechanism, it will be much less
efficient and more costly to implement than an electronic
manifest (see Section 3.6). Data submission by the UCI will
also place a larger burden on Tier 1 HSSM carriers and fleet
tracking vendors. Data intake through the UCI should be
strictly limited to data naturally flowing from truck-mounted
“smart truck” devices.



The original concept of the UCI was that the truck tracking
center (TTC) would receive a message containing location,
cargo manifest and event data from the fleet tracking
vendor. The carrier’s gate out message – routed from the
fleet tracking vendor to the TTC - would include the cargo
manifest information and truck identification information.
During the course of the shipment, the truck would provide
position updates, and provide updated location data and
alerts (as needed). Finally, assuming normal completion of
the shipment, the driver would provide a gate-in indication.



Section 3.5 touched on some of the reasons the UCI is not
the most efficient mechanism for bringing cargo manifest
data into the truck tracking solution. Beyond type and
quantity of the materials in a shipment, Tier 1 HSSM
shipping papers (manifests) will include many more data
elements. The Custom and Border Protection’s ACE truck e51

manifest, for example, has 70 data elements including many
that would be necessary in a Tier 1 HSSM manifest.
ma
Trying
to push a large number of data elements through the UCI
would not be possible.

3.7

3.8

The HTSP technology prototype
user interface was built to serve
the needs of the security specialist
that monitors hazmat
mat shipments,
however, other users also need to
use the system.

Only
one
business
process
workflow was served by the
technology prototype - many more
are needed to support TSA’s
requirements for a Tier 1 HSSM
truck tracking system.



An e-manifest
manifest solution based on XFML e-forms
e
technology
will be a more efficient and effective mechanism for loading
data on shipment transactions into a truck tracking center.
Refer to Appendix C for an overview of e-forms
e
technology.



The technology prototype was built with one graphical user
interface (GUI), the GUI for the security specialist that will
monitor hazmat shipments.
There will be other truck
tracking system users beyond the security specialist,
however.



Portals for Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers will require
new user GUIs. Also, TSA and state fusion center personnel
will need GUIs to meet their needs. In addition, internal
truck tracking center personnel
el other than Security
Specialists may need GUI’s specific to their business
requirements (i.e. watch officer, intelligence analyst, etc.).



The HTSP project developed only a single workflow/business
process – panic button alert by a hazmat driver.



Many more business processes/workflows
/workflows need to be served
in a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system. A few examples of
business processes that would need to be served include the
following.
Vehicle off route
Unanticipated trailer disconnect
Large jump in shipment risk score
Unauthorized driver attempts to pick up shipment

o
o
o

o

3.9

The panic button business process
workflow/system in the HTSP
technology prototype did not work
effectively and efficiently.



The IV&V
V report criticized the speed and reliability of the
panic button alert workflow in the HTSP technology
prototype.



According to the IV&V contractor,
“While the basic concepts of panic alert information provided to
and processed by a TTC was validated, additional and significant
system re-design
design will be required to improve the functional
reliability of these processes.”

3.10 Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers,
important external stakeholders in
TSA’s
hazmat
program,
have
workflow
needs
that
the
technology prototype did not meet.



Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers will be important external
stakeholders in a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system.



As noted in 3.8, the HTSP technology prototype only
developed one workflow. Many more will
wil be needed in a
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fully operational Tier1 HSSM truck tracking system.

3.11 The
business
rules
engine
effectively applied only one rule.
The rules engine was embedded in
a “black box” commercial product
and rules could not be easily
authored or modified.

3.12 The technology prototype did not
deploy an electronic route solution
that will enable route adherence
monitoring.



Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers will likely use the Tier 1
HSSM system to perform a number of functions including
registration, e-manifest preparation/submittal, e-route
preparation/submittal.
Workflows associated with these
functions will need to be developed.



A business rules engine is essential to developing a dynamic
risk score for hazmat shipments. The technology prototype
demonstrated that integrating a business rules engine in a
truck tracking system was practical.



The business rules engine capability in the HTSP technology
prototype was supplied by the FDFolio™ product.
The
business rules engine was, however, part of the “black box”
of the commercial FDFolio™ product and could not be
configured easily.



Only one business rule was developed in the technology
prototype.
In practice, many more will be needed.
Appendix C discusses the different types of business rules
engines and how they might be configured in a truck
tracking system.



A COTS business rules engine should be integrated into the
truck tracking center.
It will be less costly and more
efficient. Also, given that business rules will be in constant
flux, an easy-to-edit tool is essential.



Section 1553 of PL110-53 requires “motor carriers that have
a hazardous material safety permit under part 385 of title
49, Code of Federal Regulations, to maintain, follow, and
carry a route plan, in written or electronic format”.



The technology prototype did not deploy an electronic route
solution that will enable route adherence monitoring.



The HTSP prototype did not include functionality for
accepting electronic route plans from shippers or carriers.
PL110-53 was enacted while the HTSP was underway, and
electronic route plans were not included in the HTSP
contractor’s mission.



But, electronic route plans are critical to a truck tracking
program. Without an electronic route plan, a truck tracking
system cannot track carrier route adherence and geo-fence
and risk management capabilities of the system will be
substantially degraded.
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3.13 The technology prototype did not
support chain of custody monitoring
of hazmat shipments.

3.14 The technology prototype did not
deploy
an
untethered
trailer
tracking solution.

3.15 The technology prototype did not
deploy a vehicle immobilization
solution.

3.16 The technology prototype did not
deploy an electronic lock/seal
solution.



The technology prototype did not advance functionality that
would allow system users to preserve and document chain of
custody control of hazmat shipments.



While chain of custody monitoring was not advanced as a
Security Action Item, several SAIs (#17, #18, #20) are
consistent with the idea that shipment chain of custody be
tracked.



The HTSP prototype did not include
untethered trailer tracking (UTT).



FMCSA’s UTT initiative was on-going when the HTSP project
began and the HTSP contractor was not tasked with
considering untethered trailer tracking in the pilot. 2



SAI #23 recommends that Tier 1 HSSM carriers deploy a
truck-based monitoring system that includes untethered
trailer tracking (UTT) capabilities.



The FMCSA has developed functional requirements for UTT
systems, and it is clear that the technology is suitable for
implementation as part of a hazmat truck tracking system.



The HTSP prototype did not include functionality for vehicle
immobilization.



FMCSA’s vehicle immobilization initiative was on-going when
the HTSP project began and the HTSP contractor was not
tasked with considering vehicle immobilization in the pilot. 3



SAI #21 recommends Tier 1 HSSM carriers deploy a truckbased
monitoring
system
that
includes
vehicle
activation/immobilization capabilities.



The FMCSA has developed functional requirements for
vehicle immobilization systems, and it is clear that the
technology is suitable for implementation as part of a
hazmat truck tracking system



The HTSP prototype
electronic locks/seals.



SAI #13 recommends that Tier 1 HSSM carriers deploy
lock/seal systems.

did

not

include

functionality

functionality

2

for

for

FMCSA Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety and Security Systems Technology – Untethered Trailer Tracking Systems
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/systems-technology/product-guides/untethered-trailer-tracking.htm

3

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/systems-technology/productguides/vehicle-disabling.htm
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3.17 The geo-fencing
fencing solution in the
HTSP
was
based
on
flawed
assumptions about the creation and
use of geo-fences
fences by shippers and
carriers.

3.18 The
database
supporting
the
technology prototype was not
designed to support multiple user
types, multiple business process
workflows
and
the
rich
collaboration environment needed
in a Tier 1 HSSM tracking program.

3.19 The prototype did not support
variable
location
reporting
frequency by hazmat carriers (2(2
way communication).



The IV&V contractor recommended that the geo-fencing
software and operational approach in the HTSP Prototype
system should be scrapped. An operational system should
use state-of-the-art in geo-fencing
fencing applications to identify/
develop a more robust geo-fencing
fencing approach.



Section 1.10 describes the geo-fencing
fencing approach developed
by the HTSP contractor.



The technology prototype approach assumed that system
users such as hazmat carriers might be allowed to establish
geo-fences in TEAMS.
Establishment of numerous geogeo
fences in the truck tracking system has the potential for
generating an overwhelming number of alerts and false
positives for Security Specialists.



The technology prototype also advanced the idea of
generating a geo-fence around
und a truck and using it as a
buffer for detecting when a truck is nearing a critical point.
In practice, this is an unworkable solution and will create too
many false positive alerts.



A more workable concept of operations approach would
restrict geo-fence
ce creation to state and federal security
officials. Also, more frequent location reporting would make
geo-fence monitoring more viable.



Every workflow in a system will generate and/or consume
data. As noted in 3.8, only one business process workflow
was served in the HTPS. More workflows will require an
expanded database.



Also, functions such as portals, e-manifests,
manifests, e-routes,
e
UTT
monitoring and vehicle immobilization will require an
expanded database.



The IV&V contractor pointed out that the HTSP technology
prototype did not employ state-of-the-art
art technology for web
services and GIS services resulting in sluggish performance
and poor system reliability.



The IV&V contractor recommended establishment of a twotwo
way communications interface between fleet tracking
systems and TEAMS to enable the automated increase of a
truck’s reporting rate.



Two-way
way communications would allow less frequent location
reporting to the truck tracking center. Location reporting
can be automatically increased as the “risk profile” of a
shipment increases and automatically decreased when the
risk profile decreases.



Two-way
way communications was also recommended by the
HTSP contractor.
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3.20 The technology prototype only
allows a security specialist to
manage a single incident.

3.21 The
technology
prototype
is
vulnerable to false positives
s which
could
ould
overwhelm
security
specialists
in
an
operational
setting.

3.22 The technology prototype drew
upon a limited set of data from
external sources.

3.23 The technology prototype did not
support
collaborative
exchange
with government agencies during a
transportation security incident especially lacking are collaborative
tools to support state fusion
centers.



There are about 2 million Tier 1 HSSM shipments per year in
the United States. This means that a Tier 1 HSSM truck
tracking center systems will constantly monitor about 5000
active shipments.



A business rules engine (see 3.11) will apply dynamic risk
modeling algorithms to identify the riskiest shipments to
provide security specialists the capability of monitoring the
most serious shipments.



The technology prototype did not allow security specialists to
manage multiple incidents – a likely event.
event
In the
technology prototype, the security specialist was equipped
with a single screen/GUI desktop. A different setup using
windows and multiple monitors would allow the security
sec
specialist to manage multiple incidents.



Too many false positive alerts would quickly overwhelm an
operational truck tracking center.
Geo
Geo-fence
and route
adherence violations could be particularly problematic.



The technology prototype did not develop the capability to
detect and manage false positives. While not a pressing
issue in the pilot, full system loading could cause operational
failure.



The technology prototype drew on data from fleet tracking
vendor systems via the UCI.



The technology prototype did not, however, draw data from
external databases during the pilot. In practice, a Tier 1
HSSM truck tracking system would actively draw on a
number of external data sources.



As noted in 3.2, collaboration
ollaboration options in the technology
prototype were limited. There
e was too much reliance on
telephone communication in the HTSP concept of operations.



As noted in 3.4, state fusion center collaboration was not
built into the concept of operations for the HTSP technology
prototype.



The IV&V contractor noted that the HTSP Staged Event
Testing showed a substantial series of system operational
problems related to alert notification and truck tracking
center communication issues.
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3.24 The prototype’s design cannot
effectively support the transaction
volume expected in an operational
system.

3.25 The HTSP technology prototype will
not meet the operational needs of
first responders.

3.26 The technology prototype is not
National
Incident
Management
System (NIMS) compliant and will
w
not support law enforcement and
emergency response needs at the
state/local level.

3.27 The technology prototype lacked
intelligence analysis capabilities.
capabilities

3.28 The technology prototype lacked
security features that would be
required in a system handling
business
confidential,
security
securitysensitive data.



The transaction volume in an operational system will be
about 2 million shipments per year versus only a handful of
shipment transactions in the technology prototype.



Even with limited transaction loading, the IV&V contractor
cited
d sluggish and inefficient performance by the technology
prototype.



The IV&V contractor stated that the HTSP Prototype system
has significant deficiencies in fulfilling expected first
responder requirements.



Collaboration capabilities in the technology prototype are
limited.



The IV&V contractor cited a lack of conformance with the
National Incident Management System guidelines.



NIMS compliance is important to insure that the system will
support law enforcement and emergency response needs.



The technology prototype did not have data mining or
business analytics functionality.



Lacking this capability, the ability to anticipate problems
before they occur is extremely limited.



Lightweight security features were built into the HTSP
technology prototype.
An operational system will need
strong security functionality.

57

blank page

58

4.0 Tier 1 HSSM Truck Tracking System
Recommendations
Section 3 identified “gaps” between the HTSP technology pilot and an operational Tier 1
HSSM truck tracking system. This section provides recommendations for addressing
those “gaps”. The following figure lists recommendations and associated “gaps”.

Gaps
(from Section 3)
The HTSP technology prototype was not built to
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)

Recommendations

1.

Only one business process workflow was served by
the technology prototype - many more are needed to
support TSA’s requirements for a Tier 1 HSSM truck
tracking system. (3.8)

Build the truck tracking system to monitor shipments
of TSA-designated Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive
Materials in the context of a Tier 1 HSSSM regulatory
program based on TSA’s Security Action Items.


Design the tracking system to serve as the implementing
tool for TSA Tier 1 HSSM regulations (Tier 1 HSSM SAIs).
Functionality includes:

The The technology prototype did not deploy:


an electronic route solution that will enable route
adherence monitoring. (3.12)



an untethered trailer tracking solution. (3.14)



a vehicle immobilization solution. (3.15)



an electronic lock/seal solution. (3.16)

The database supporting the technology prototype
was not designed to support multiple user types,
multiple business process workflows and the rich
collaboration environment needed in a Tier 1 HSSM
tracking program. (3.18)

The HTSP technology prototype was not built to
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
The HTSP technology prototype relied too heavily on
the Universal Communications Interface to bring data
into the TEAMS application. (3.5)

o

Vehicle tracking

o

Untethered trailer tracking

o

Vehicle immobilization

o

Electronic route plans

o

Electronic manifests (shipping papers)

o

Route adherence monitoring

o

Driver authentication

o

Electronic locks/monitoring

o

Driver panic button/alerts



Full satisfaction of PL 110-53 requirements. Regulated
parties (system users) will include Tier 1 HSSM shippers
and carriers and fleet tracking vendors.



North American coverage; expected transaction volume
about 2 million Tier 1 HSSM transactions/year.

2.

Incorporate the Universal Communications Interface
built during the TSA HTSP into the truck tracking
center but refine it to support a different concept of
operations plan.


Dataflow from carriers through the UCI should be
restricted to vehicle location, gate out/in messages, and
alerts from on-board sensors.



Do not use the UCI as the mechanism to capture load or
route information. Use shipper/carrier portals for
preparation/submission of electronic manifests (load) and
electronic route plans.



Do not use the UCI as the mechanism to capture
corporate information for a particular shipment. Use
shipper/carrier portals to capture corporate data . Draw
corporate data from the registration database to support
transaction business processes (e-manifests, e-routes,
etc.).
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The HTSP technology prototype was not built to
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)

3.

Outdated
and/or
underpowered
tools
(GIS,
collaboration, web services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The HTSP technology prototype user interface was
built to serve the needs of the security specialist that
monitors hazmat shipments, however, other users
also need to use the system. (3.7)
Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers, important external
stakeholders in TSA’s hazmat program, have workflow
needs that the technology prototype did not meet.
(3.10)

Outdated
and/or
underpowered
tools
(GIS,
collaboration, web services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)

Build portals with rich functionality for Tier 1 HSSM
shippers and carriers; provide 24/7 access to corporate
and shipment transaction data.


Build user portals to allow Tier 1 HSSM shippers/carriers
24/7 access to their data and to allow them to efficiently
implement business processes associated with the truck
tracking center: e-manifest submission, e-route
submission.



Build portals to provide shippers and carriers access to
shipment transactions: in-progress and completed.



Every shipper and carrier will have their own portal (“my
portal”). Portals will allow company administrators to
establish corporate user rights.



Build portals to allow shippers and carriers to complete
system registration – i.e. load corporate data into the
system database.

4.

Replicate data-merge and data-presentation functions
of TEAMS in a truck tracking system but build it using
more sophisticated toolsets to optimize speed,
functionality, and business process workflow.


The technology prototype’s alert notification and
communications
functions were degraded by
architectural design flaws. (3.3)

Merge information from the electronic manifest, the
electronic route plan, vehicle location, and alerts to
answer the following questions (see Figure 1.1).









The technology prototype did not employ an
electronic manifest solution that would allow it to
efficiently accept load/driver/shipment information.
(3.6)
The panic button business process workflow/system in
the HTSP technology prototype did not work
effectively and efficiently. (3.9)
The business rules engine effectively applied only one
rule. The rules engine was embedded in a “black box”
commercial product and rules could not be easily
authored or modified. (3.11)
The
technology
prototype
did
not
support
collaborative exchange with government agencies
during a transportation security incident - especially
lacking are collaborative tools to support state fusion
centers. (3.23)
The prototype’s design cannot effectively support the
transaction volume expected in an operational
system. (3.24)

The HTSP technology prototype was not built to
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
The HTSP technology prototype user interface was
built to serve the needs of the security specialist that
monitors hazmat shipments, however, other users

5.

What is the truck carrying?
What is the shipment risk profile?
Who is driving the truck?
What is the truck’s location?
Is there a problem? What?
What is the truck’s destination?
What route has the truck followed?
Is the truck off-route?



Deploy XFML technology (e-forms) to build an electronic
manifest application to capture load information. Access
via portal.



Build an electronic route preparation tool to support easy
preparation/storage of carrier-defined routes. Access via
portal.



E-manifest and e-route tools will draw on corporate data
captured though registration.



Use latest GIS and portal (collaboration) tools to support
development of the truck tracking center.



Build to efficiently process expected Tier 1
transaction traffic – 2 million transactions/year.

HSSM

Substantially expand the list of workflows/business
processes served beyond those currently served by
TEAMS.


The only business process addressed in the HTSP was
the process associated with a driver panic button alert.
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also need to use the system. (3.7)

The HTSP concept of operations was built around the
actions that would be taken in the event of a panic
button alert.

Only one business process workflow was served by
the technology prototype - many more are needed to
support TSA’s requirements for a Tier 1 HSSM truck
tracking system. (3.8)



To support TSA’s SAIs, the system will need to serve
specific business processes associated with the SAIs.
For example, what needs to be done if:

Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers, important external
stakeholders in TSA’s hazmat program, have workflow
needs that the technology prototype did not meet.
(3.10)



An unauthorized driver attempts to pick up a Tier 1 HSSM
shipment (SAI #6)?



A trailer is unexpectedly detached from a tractor during a
shipment (SAI #23)?



A truck is substantially late or off-route of its expected
route (SAIs #17,18)?



An electronic lock is breached during transit (SAI #13)?

The The technology prototype did not deploy:


an electronic route solution that will enable route
adherence monitoring. (3.12)



an untethered trailer tracking solution. (3.14)



a vehicle immobilization solution. (3.15)



an electronic lock/seal solution. (3.16)

The HTSP technology prototype was not built to
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)



6.

Outdated
and/or
underpowered
tools
(GIS,
collaboration, web services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The technology prototype did not deploy an electronic
route solution that will enable route adherence
monitoring. (3.12)

The HTSP technology prototype was not built to
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
Outdated
and/or
underpowered
tools
(GIS,
collaboration, web services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The HTSP technology prototype relied too heavily on
the Universal Communications Interface to bring data
into the TEAMS application. (3.5)
The technology prototype did not employ an
electronic manifest solution that would allow it to
efficiently accept load/driver/shipment information.
(3.6)

7.

Workflows need to extend beyond the Security
Specialist desktop to TSA. State fusion centers,
emergency responders, etc.

Incorporate an on-line electronic route plan tool into
the system for shippers/carriers to use to prepare and
submit e-route plans via a portal.


Build an electronic route authoring tool accessible to
shippers and carriers via their portals. Use advanced
GIS tools to build the e-route authoring tool.



Shippers/carriers can create and store e-routes on-line.
They can retrieve them when needed and associate the
e-route with a shipment as needed.



Electronic route plans must be submitted at or before
“gate-out”. The route followed by a carrier from “gateout” to “gate-in” will be stored on shipper/carrier
portals.

Incorporate an XFML-based electronic manifest tool
into the system for shippers/carriers to use to prepare
and submit e-manifests via a portal.


Build an electronic manifest authoring tool accessible to
shippers and carriers via their portals. Use an xfml eforms tool to build the electronic manifest tool.



Shippers/carriers can create and store electronic
manifests on-line. They can retrieve them when needed
to support a shipment.



Electronic manifests must be submitted at or before
“gate-out”.
Electronic manifests from completed
transactions will be stored on shipper/carrier portals.

The technology prototype did not support chain of
custody monitoring of hazmat shipments. (3.13)
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Outdated
and/or
underpowered
tools
(GIS,
collaboration, web services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)

8.

The geo-fencing solution in the HTSP was based on
flawed assumptions about the creation and use of
geo-fences by shippers and carriers. (3.17)
The prototype did not support variable location
reporting frequency by hazmat carriers (2-way
communication). (3.19)

The HTSP technology prototype was not built to
support a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on
Security Action Item compliance. (3.1)
The technology prototype did not deploy:

an untethered trailer tracking solution. (3.14)

a vehicle immobilization solution. (3.15)

The HTSP technology prototype user interface was
built to serve the needs of the security specialist that
monitors hazmat shipments, however, other users
also need to use the system. (3.7)

9.

Scrap the geo-fencing approach used in the TSA HTSP;
rebuild using upgraded GIS tools.


Build a geo-fencing authoring tool using advanced GIS
tools.



Only authorized state and federal users will be allowed
to create a geo-fence in the system.



Geo-fences can have a wide range of attributes. A
modeling tool will support analysis of the impact of each
geo-fence on workload before the geo-fence may be
loaded into the system.



Geo-fences must be “reauthorized” periodically to avoid
being purged from the tracking system.

Build the truck tracking center system to support
untethered trailer tracking and vehicle immobilization.


The UCI will be the path for alerts.



Business rules risk scoring will likely push scores up
high enough to require immediate attention of Security
Specialists.



Workflows specifically built for each scenario will
support investigation/resolution by the Security
Specialist.

10. Build desktops to meet the operational needs of
personnel serving in the truck tracking center including
security specialists and intelligence analysts.


Security specialists will monitor shipments 24/7 and
respond to issues arising with in-transit shipments.



Intelligence analysts will react to security alerts from
TSA and modify business rules to reflect immediate
issues. Analysts will also identify issues and anomalies
in shipments to prevent or mitigate incidents.



Other desktops might include a watch commander
desktop and a user support desktop.

The technology prototype lacked intelligence analysis
capabilities. (3.27)

Outdated
and/or
underpowered
tools
(GIS,
collaboration, web services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The technology prototype’s alert notification and
communications
functions were degraded by
architectural design flaws. (3.3)
The database supporting the technology prototype
was not designed to support multiple user types,
multiple business process workflows and the rich
collaboration environment needed in a Tier 1 HSSM
tracking program. (3.18)

11. Rebuild the security specialist’s desktop application to
support management of multiple incidents and to serve
collaboration needs with TSA, state fusion centers,
hazmat carriers/drivers, and first responders.


Security specialists will likely use multi-screen
workstations, and will need to be able to manage
multiple incidents/issues at a time.



Security specialists need to call upon a mix of
communication tools to meet workflow needs. For
example, if the workflow calls for a conference call with
TSA and a state fusion center, the Security Specialist
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The technology prototype only allows a security
specialist to manage a single incident. (3.20)

should be able to initiate the call automatically from the
desktop.


Security Specialists should be able to collaborate
efficiently with state fusion centers and first responders.
Collaboration tools need to support efficient workflow
from the truck tracking center all the way down to the
field level.

The
technology
prototype
did
not
support
collaborative exchange with government agencies
during a transportation security incident - especially
lacking are collaborative tools to support state fusion
centers. (3.23)

Outdated
and/or
underpowered
tools
(GIS,
collaboration, web services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)
The business rules engine effectively applied only one
rule. The rules engine was embedded in a “black box”
commercial product and rules could not be easily
authored or modified. (3.11)

The business rules engine effectively applied only one
rule. The rules engine was embedded in a “black box”
commercial product and rules could not be easily
authored or modified. (3.11)

12. Build a stand-alone business rules engine into the
truck tracking center using a COTS software product.


Use a powerful COTS business rules engine as a standalone tool – i.e. not integrated into a “black box”
application.



The business rules engine should be easy to modify “on
the fly” by business analysts.



Rule processing – especially alert processing - must be
almost instantaneous.

13. Use the business rules engine to support dynamic risk
profiling and to manage work load at the truck tracking
center.


The business rules engine will create a risk score for a
shipment at “gate-out”. Risk scoring will be updated
continuously between “gate-out” and “gate-in”. For
example, every location update will result in rescoring
for a shipment.



While the application will likely start with a simple set of
rules, the rules may grow in complexity over time to
reflect TSA’s risk outlook.



Rules should always be tested before live loading to
avoid overwhelming the truck tracking center with low
priority alerts.

The technology prototype only allows a security
specialist to manage a single incident. (3.20)
The technology prototype is vulnerable to false
positive which would overwhelm security specialists in
an operational setting. (3.21)

The geo-fencing solution in the HTSP was based on
flawed assumptions about the creation and use of
geo-fences by shippers and carriers. (3.17)
The prototype did not support variable location
reporting frequency by hazmat carriers (2-way
communication). (3.19)

14. Build 2-way communications capabilities between the
truck tracking system and fleet tracking vendor
systems to manage data reporting (variable reporting
frequencies).


SAI #23 recommends location reporting every 15
minutes. Depending on the risk profile of the load, a 15
minute reporting interval may be over-reporting or
under-reporting.



Fleet tracking vendors’ systems must be able to accept
an automated request from the truck tracking center to
adjust reporting frequency.



For low-risk shipments in sparsely populated areas,
reporting intervals >> 15 minutes may be sufficient.
For high-risk shipments in sensitive areas, reporting
intervals < 15 minutes may be needed.
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Outdated
and/or
underpowered
tools
(GIS,
collaboration, web services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)

15. Build an interface between the truck tracking center
and state fusion centers to enable coordinated
response to transportation security incidents.

The concept of operations underlying the HTSP
technology prototype was flawed and substantially
incomplete and did not reflect the critical role of
states and other parties in securing the hazmat
supply chain. (3.4)
The
technology
prototype
did
not
support
collaborative exchange with government agencies
during a transportation security incident - especially
lacking are collaborative tools to support state fusion
centers. (3.23)

Outdated
and/or
underpowered
tools
(GIS,
collaboration, web services) were used to build the
HTSP technology prototype. (3.2)



State fusion centers are a key point of contact for the truck
tracking center, and many business processes will involve
communication/collaboration with fusion center staff.



Collaboration must be efficient, fast, and easy. Automated
or desk-top initiated communication will be a key feature of
the Security Specialist desktop.



Collaboration must flow through the state fusion center
down to first responders in the field.



A state fusion center will have access to its state’s “common
operating picture” (COP). The state’s COP will include data
on shipments originating or ending in the state as well as
shipments passing though the state. The COP will feature a
map visualization of in-transit shipments.



In the event of a transportation security incident, truck
tracking systems will automatically initiate contact with the
state fusion center and “push” information on the shipment
to the fusion center.



The truck tracking center will have a “response toolkit”
available to support the state and first responders in the
event of a declared security incident, and will provide
support and assistance until the incident is resolved.

16. Build a NIMS-compliant communications infrastructure
that will support efficient collaboration during a
transportation security incident.

The concept of operations underlying the HTSP
technology prototype was flawed and substantially
incomplete and did not reflect the critical role of
states and other parties in securing the hazmat
supply chain. (3.4)
The
technology
prototype
did
not
support
collaborative exchange with government agencies
during a transportation security incident - especially
lacking are collaborative tools to support state fusion
centers. (3.23)



Truck tracking center systems and business processes will
be NIMS-compliant.



Extend business processes/workflows though the state
fusion centers to emergency responders.



As noted in #15, the truck tracking center will support state
fusion centers, local governments, and first responders in
the event of a transportation security incident.



As noted in #4, state-of-the-art communications and
collaboration tools will be used to support the interface
between the truck tracking center and state fusion centers.

The HTSP technology prototype will not meet the
operational needs of first responders. (3.25)
The technology prototype is not National Incident
Management System (NIMS) compliant and will not
support law enforcement and emergency response
needs at the state/local level. (3.26)

The technology prototype drew upon a limited set of
data from external sources. (3.22)
The technology prototype lacked intelligence analysis
capabilities. (3.27)

17. Build intelligence analysis capability into the truck
tracking center.


Build an intelligence analyst desktop to support the capability
to anticipate and prevent security incidents.
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The concept of operations underlying the HTSP
technology prototype was flawed and substantially
incomplete and did not reflect the critical role of
states and other parties in securing the hazmat
supply chain. (3.4)

18. Build the truck tracking center to support efficient
integration with DTTS, TRANSCOM and ACE.


Integrate the Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking electronic manifest
with the Custom and Border Protection truck e-manifest.



Build an interface with DTTS to bring data on military
munitions shipments into the truck tracking system.
Similarly, build an interface with DOE’s shipment tracking
system.

Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers, important external
stakeholders in TSA’s hazmat program, have workflow
needs that the technology prototype did not meet.
(3.10)
The database supporting the technology prototype
was not designed to support multiple user types,
multiple business process workflows and the rich
collaboration environment needed in a Tier 1 HSSM
tracking program. (3.18)
The technology prototype drew upon a limited set of
data from external sources. (3.22)

The technology prototype lacked sufficient system
security. (3.28)

19. Build a strong security infrastructure for the truck
tracking system.


Build a security infrastructure to protect
confidential and security sensitive information.



Build a desktop for a network security specialist.
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Appendix A
TSA Universal Communications Interface

1. Universal Communications Interface - Interface Control (Version 1.6)
http://www.tsa.gov/assets/doc/universal_interface_control_document.doc

This document provides the details to enable a commercial truck tracking system to implement the non-proprietary
universal interface set of protocols that enable the transmission of data from all commercially available tracking
systems to the centralized truck tracking center.


Section 2 identifies the Government and non-Government specifications and standards that apply to this
system specification.



Section 3 describes the implementation of the universal communications interface.



Section 4 contains sample universal interface messages.

2. Universal Communications Interface - Interface Requirements
Specification (IRS) (Version 1.5)
http://www.tsa.gov/assets/doc/universal_interface_requirements_specification.doc
This document specifies the requirements for implementing a centralized truck tracking center and for creating a
non-proprietary UCI set of protocols to enable the transmission of data from all commercially available tracking
systems to the centralized truck tracking center.


Section 2 defines the requirements for the UCI.



Section 3 identifies the qualification provisions that will assure each requirement from section 3 is met.



Section 4 specifies the requirements traceability.



Section 5 contains a listing of all acronyms and abbreviations used, and their meanings.
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Appendix B
TSA Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items
1.0

Hazmat security is driving the development of new regulations.

The government’s focus on hazmat transportation has intensified since 9/11. Prior to
9/11, the regulatory and legislative primary focus was on hazmat shipment safety. But
since 9/11, the federal government has pursued an expanded regulatory and legislative
legislat
agenda that recognizes the need to protect the hazmat supply chain from terrorists.

Since 9/11, the government’s
regulatory
emphasis
for
hazmat shipments has shifted
from safety to security.

Figure B.1 presents a timeline of regulatory and legislative developments that affect
hazmat shipment security. Sections 2.2 - 2.5 discuss the implications of these
developments on the design and operation of the North American Transportation
Security Center.
Figure B.1 Hazmat Security Regulations and Legislation Timeline

2.0

In 2007, TSA assumed the lead federal responsibility for hazmat
transportation security rulemaking.

DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) published a notice in
the Federal Register on June 27, 2007 advising that the Transportation Security
Administration has assumed the lead role from PHMSA for rulemaking addressing the
security off motor carrier shipments of hazardous materials.
The action was consistent with and supportive of the respective transportation security
roles and responsibilities of the Department of Transportation and DHS as delineated in
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed September 28, 2004, and of TSA and
PHMSA as outlined in an Annex to that MOU signed August 7, 2006.
The PHMSA also used the Federal Register notice to withdraw an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) related to hazmat transportation
transportat
security that the
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TSA has the lead responsibility
for
hazmat
transportation
security rulemaking.

PHMSA had published on July 16, 2002. The ANPRM solicited comments on a variety of
security measures that might be required of hazmat carriers to improve hazmat supply
chain security including the use of vehicle tracking and monitoring
monitoring systems, emergency
warning systems, and remote shut-offs.
shut
Follow-up
up action to the ANPRM had been put on
hold in light of the FMCSA’s Field Operations Test (refer to Section 4.1 of this report)
and TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (refer to Section 4.2
4.2 of this report) as well as the
shifting responsibilities of DOT and DHS.
With this Federal Register notice, TSA will be responsible for all future security
regulations for hazmat motor carriers.

3.0

TSA’s highway security-sensitive
security guidance recognizes two
classes of highway securitysensitive materials:

Almost one year to the day that TSA formally assumed the lead federal responsibility
responsibili for
hazmat transportation security regulations, TSA issued guidance for shippers and
carriers of highway security-sensitive
security
materials. The guidance was issued by TSA’s
Assistant Administrator for Transportation Sector Network Management on June 26,
2008. 1 TSA’s guidance recognizes two tiers of highway security-sensitive
security sensitive materials.
1.

Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive
Security Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) – HSSM
transported by motor vehicle whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism
include a highly significant level of adverse effects on human life, environmental
damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption. A full list of Tier
1 HSSM may be found in Appendix B.

2.

Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive
Security Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 HSSM) - HSSM
transported by motor vehicle whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism
include moderately significant level of adverse effects on human life
li or health,
environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption. A
full list of Tier 2 HSSM may be found in Appendix B.

 Tier 1 which can cause highly
significant adverse effects
from terrorist actions; and
 Tier 2 which can cause
moderately significant adverse
effects from terrorist actions.

TSA issued guidance for shippers and carriers of highway
security-sensitive
sensitive materials on June 26, 2008.

3.1 TSA’s security recommendations incorporate earlier DOT guidance.
TSA developed its guidance in conjunction with other Federal agencies including DOT’s
Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) and DOT’s Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration. The TSA guidance builds upon existing PHMSA and
FMCSA hazmat regulations including PHMSA’s hazmat safety regulatory provisions in
49CFR172.704 and 172.800 that require hazmat carriers to develop and implement
security programs and to train employees in security matters. TSA has, however,
enhanced earlier guidance to strengthen en-route
en
security measures for shippers and
carriers of high-risk
high
materials.
TSA’s guidance is not mandatory for hazmat shippers and receivers. Shippers and
carriers are, however, advised by TSA to implement security programs consistent with
TSA June 26th guidance.
3.2 TSA recommends more stringent security measures for Tier 1 highway
security-sensitive
sensitive materials.
TSA published Security Action
Items (SAIs) for Tier 1 and Tier
2 HSSM shipments. SAIs are
voluntary.

As illustrated in Figure B.2, TSA listed 23 Security Action Items (SAI) in its June 26th
guidance. The SAIs are divided into four categories:
1.

general security;

2.

personnel security;

3.

unauthorized access; and

4.

en-route
route security.

1

Letter to Highway and Motor Carrier Stakeholders; John P. Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network
Management, US Transportation Security Administration; June 26, 2008.
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Figure B.2 TSA HSSM Security Action Items

TSA HSSM Security Action Items
General Security:

En-Route Security:

1.

Security Assessment and Security Plan Requirements.

2.

Awareness of Industry Security Practices.

10. Establish Communications Plan.

3.

Inventory Control Process.

11. Establish Appropriate Vehicle Security Program.

4.

Business and Security Critical Information

12. Establish Appropriate Cargo Security Program.
13. Implement a Seal/Lock Control Program.
14. High Alert Level Protocols.

Personnel Security:

15. Establish Security Inspection Policy and Procedures.

5.

Possession of a Valid Commercial Drivers License Hazardous Materials Endorsement.

16. Establish Reporting Policy and Procedures.

6.

Background Checks for Highway Transportation Sector
Hazmat Employees other than Motor Vehicle Drivers
with a Valid CDL with HME.

18. Preplanning Routes.

7.

Security Awareness Training for Hazmat Employees.

17. Shipment Pre-Planning, Advance Notice of Arrival, and
Receipt of Confirmation Procedures.
19. Security for Trips Exceeding Driver Hours of Service.
20. Dedicated Truck.
21. Tractor Activation Capability.

Unauthorized Access:

22. Panic Button Capability.

8.

Access Control System for Drivers.

9.

Access Control System for Facilities Incidental to
Transport.

23. Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems

TSA recommends that shippers and carriers of Tier 2 HSSMs adopt the first sixteen SAIs
and that shippers and carriers of Tier 1 HSSMs, the riskiest materials from a security
perspective, adopt the first sixteen SAIs as well as TSA’s security action items 17-23. A
discussion of TSA’s security action items 17-23 follows.
Security Action Item #17. Shipment Pre-Planning, Advance Notice of Arrival
and Receipt Confirmation Procedures with Receiving Facility – The shipper
(consignor), motor carrier and receiver (consignee) should conduct shipment preplanning to ensure shipments are not released to the motor carrier until they can be
transported to destination with the least public exposure and minimal delay in transit.
Shipment pre-planning should include establishing the estimated time of arrival (ETA)
agreeable to consignor, motor carrier, and consignee; load specifics (shipping paper
information), and driver identification. When shipments are in transit, the motor carrier
should coordinate with consignee to confirm the pre-established ETA will be met, or
agree on a new ETA. Upon receipt of the shipment consignees should notify the shipper
that the shipment has arrived on schedule and materials are accounted for. Methods for
advance notice and confirmation of receipt of shipments include electronic mail and
voice communications. When practical, consignees should immediately alert the
appropriate shipper or motor carrier if the shipment fails to arrive on schedule or if a
material shortage is discovered. Methods for immediate alert notifications should be
made by voice communications only. Where immediate notification is not practical (for
example at unmanned facilities), the consignor, the motor carrier, and consignee should
agree on alternate confirmation (method and time) of delivery and receipt. Consignees
should make every effort possible to accept a shipment that arrives during non-business
hours due to unforeseen circumstances.
Security Action Item #18. Preplanning Routes – Employers should ensure
preplanning of primary and alternate routes. This preplanning should seek to avoid or
minimize proximity to highly populated urban areas or critical infrastructure such as
bridges, dams, and tunnels. Policies governing operations during periods of Orange or
Red alert levels under the Homeland Security Advisory System should plan for alternate
routing for TIER 1 HSSM shipments away from highly populated urban areas and critical
infrastructure. The motor carrier or law enforcement officials may determine when to
implement alternate routing. Drivers should be encouraged to notify the company’s
dispatch center when substantial en-route deviation is necessary.
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SAIs 17-23 apply only to
Tier 1 HSSM shipments.

SAI #17 calls for close
coordination between shipper
and receiver including use of
communication systems to
establish ETA and to track
delivery schedules.

SAI #18 suggests shippers
and carriers establish primary
and alternate routes. Carriers
should avoid highly populated
urban
areas
or
critical
infrastructure during Orange
or Red alerts.

SAI #19 suggests carriers
take
security
precautions
when trips are interrupted so
that drivers meet hours of
service requirements.

SAI
#20
suggests
that
carriers
should
not
subcontract
or
transload
unless the subcontractor is
security cleared.

SAI
#21
suggests
that
carriers user in-cab devices
that require drivers to log-in
to drive the tractor. SAI #22
suggests that drivers have
access to a panic button (incab and/or remote).

SAI #23 suggests the use of
tractor and trailer tracking
systems.
Systems should
allow for route adherence
tracking and monitoring of
trailer
“connect”
and
“disconnect”.

Security Action Item #19. Security for Trips Exceeding Driving Time under the
Hours of Service of Drivers Regulation (49 CFR Part 395) – Employers should
examine security in light of hours of service available and take steps to mitigate the
vulnerabilities associated with extended rest stops for driver relief. Examples include
methods such as constant vehicle attendance or visual observation with the vehicle,
driver teams, or vetted companions. Other examples include arranging secure locations
along the route through mutual agreement with industry partners and stakeholders, or
Security Action Item #20. Dedicated Truck – Employers should implement policies
to ensure that, except under emergency circumstances, contracted shipments remain
with the primary carrier and are not subcontracted, driver/team substitutions are not
made, and transloading does not occur unless the subcontractor has been confirmed to
comply with applicable Federal safety and security guidance and regulations and
company security policies.
Security Action Item #21. Tractor Activation Capability – Employers should
implement security measures that require driver identification by login and password or
biometric data to drive the tractor. Companies should provide written policies and
instructions to drivers explaining the activation process.
Security Action Item #22. Panic Button Capability – Employers should implement
means for a driver to transmit an emergency alert notification to dispatch. “Panic
Button” technology enables a driver to remotely send an emergency alert notification
message either via Satellite or Terrestrial Communications, and/or utilize the remote
Panic Button to disable the vehicle.
Security Action Item #23. Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems – Employers
should have the ability of implementing methods of tracking the tractor and trailer
throughout the intended route with satellite and/or land-based wireless GPS
communications systems. Tracking methods for the tractor and trailer should provide
current position by latitude and longitude. Geo-fencing and route monitoring capabilities
allow authorized users to define and monitor routes and risk areas. If the tractor and/or
trailer deviates from a specified route or enters a risk area, an alert notification should
be sent to the dispatch center. An employer or an authorized representative should have
the ability to remotely monitor trailer “connect” and “disconnect” events. Employers or
an authorized representative should have the ability to poll the tractor and trailer
tracking units to request a current location and status report. Tractor position reporting
frequency should be configured at not more than 15-minute intervals. Trailer position
reporting frequency should be configured to provide a position report periodically when
the trailer has been subject to an unauthorized disconnect from the tractor. The
reporting frequency should be at an interval that assists the employer in locating and
recovering the trailer in a timely manner. The tractor and trailer tracking system should
be tested periodically and the results of the test should be recorded
Figure B.3 lists Tier 1 HSSMs and the number of annual U.S. shipments of each HSSM.

4.0 The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (PL 110-53/H.R. 1) requires
TSA to take action on hazmat shipment tracking.
On August 3, 2007, President Bush signed the “Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007”. This comprehensive legislation consists of 24 Titles
addressing a broad range of matters intended to enhance homeland security and
counter the terrorist threat.

President Bush signed P.L. 11053 on August 3, 2007.
It
includes provisions to enhance
transportation security.

The Act is a consolidation of three former House and Senate bills – H.R. 1, which bore
the title “Implementing the 9-11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007”; S. 4,
“Improving America’s Security Act of 2007”; and H.R. 1401, “Rail and Public
Transportation Security Act of 2007.”
Subject areas covered in the Act include homeland security and emergency
management performance grants; communications interoperability; strengthening use
of the incident command system; improving intelligence and information sharing and
Congressional oversight of intelligence; preventing terrorist travel; privacy and civil
liberties; private sector preparedness; improving critical infrastructure security;
enhanced defenses against weapons of mass destruction; enhancing transportation
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Figure B.3 TSA
A Tier 1 HSSMs
DOT Hazard Class

Threshold Quantity

Number of Annual U.S.
Shipments 2

Division 1.1
Division 1.2
Division 1.3
Explosives

Any quantity

Domestic - 11,868
NAFTA – 524

Division 2.2
Non-Flammable Gas (also meeting
the definition of a material
poisonous by inhalation)

Anhydrous ammonia (UN1005) in single bulk
packaging >300 L or 3000 kg

Division 2.3
Toxic (Poison) Gas

Hazard zone A & B >5lbs. in a single package

Division 2.3
Toxic (Poison) Gas

Hazmat
Placard

Domestic - 563,771
NAFTA - 6,767

3

Domestic - 960,871
NAFTA - 8,233

Hazard zone C & D in single bulk packaging >3000L or
3000kg

Class 3 Flammable Liquids (also
meeting the definition of a
material poisonous by inhalation)

PG I in single bulk packaging > 3000 L or 3000 kg

Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials
(also meeting the definition of a
material poisonous by inhalation)

Hazard zone A & B > 5 lbs. in a single package

Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials
(also meeting the definition of a
material poisonous by inhalation)

Hazard zone C & D in single bulk packaging > 3000 l or
3000 kg

Class 7 Radioactive Materials

IAEA Code of Conduct Category 1 and 2 materials
including Highway Route Controlled quantities as
defined in 49 CFR 173.403 or known as radionuclides
in forms as RAM-QC by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission

Class 8 Corrosive Materials (also
meeting the definition of a
material poisonous by inhalation)

Packing group I and II in single bulk packaging > 3000
L or 3000 kg

Other Materials

Any quantity of chemicals listed by the Chemical
Weapons Convention on Schedules.

Domestic - 62,015,889
NAFTA - 119,816

Domestic - 307,244
NAFTA - 18,213

Domestic - 7,777
NAFTA - 7,265

Domestic - 4,548,595
NAFTA - 95,703

2

Data on the number of Tier 1 HSSM shipments was provided by David Cooper, Program Manager, Highway & Motor Carrier
Division, U.S. Transportation Security Administration. Data represents 2005 projections
projections for US domestic and NAFTA truck traffic for
select hazmat commodities.
3

This figure includes shipments of Division 2.2 Non-Flammable
Non Flammable Gases (subsidiary hazard Oxidizer Division 5.1) that are not
inhalation toxic.
4

This figure includes shipments of : 1). Class 3 Flammable Liquids (PGI and II in single bulk
bulk packaging > 300L or 3000 kg; and 2).
Class 3 Flammable Liquids (any quantity
antity desensitized explosives) – that are not inhalation toxic.
5

This figure includes shipments
ipments of Class 8 Corrosive Materials (Packing group I in single bulk packaging > 3000L or 3000kg) which
are not inhalation toxic.
This figure does not include Tier 1 Division 2.2 Non-Flammable
Non
Gas (also
also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by
inhalation) or Tier 1 Class 3 Flammable Liquids (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by inhalation) or Class 8
Corrosive Materials (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by inhalation).
inhalation). Data is unavailable on the number of
o these
shipments.
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5

unknown

Domestic – 1,287.760
NAFTA – 34,235

6

4

6

security; preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism;
international cooperation on security technologies; 9/11 Commission international
implementation; and advancing democratic values.
4.1 Earlier legislative initiatives paved the way for PL 110-53.
Use of smart
is voluntary,
regulatory
mandatory
increasing.

truck technology
but legislative &
pressure
for
deployment
is

To date, adoption of smart truck technology to protect hazmat shipments has been
voluntary on the part of trucking fleets. And, many fleets – especially the larger, longhaul fleets – have extensive smart truck technology systems in place. For example,
Qualcomm – a participant in the FMCSA smart truck technology study – has installed its
commercial communications and position-reporting technology on more than 500,000
commercial vehicles.
Qualcomm’s customers include more than 1,500 trucking
companies, and 34 of the top 35 truckload fleets. However, even with the commercial
success of Qualcomm and others, the FMCSA study concluded that smart truck
technology has not been deployed extensively enough in the hazmat supply chain and
that the government security infrastructure is not sufficiently developed to provide the
level of protection the country needs for hazmat shipments.
A number of regulatory/legislative initiatives have been undertaken by government
agencies to accelerate the deployment of smart truck technology to protect hazmat
shipments.

In 2004, California considered
requiring
all
hazmat
transporters to install GPS and
remote
vehicle
shutdown
devices on their trucks.

AB 575 was opposed by the
trucking industry and was
tabled in the California Senate.

Since 9/11 federal legislators
have become concerned about
the use of hazmat shipments as
weapons of mass destruction.

In 2004, the State of California considered legislation (AB 575) that would have
required all California registered trucks engaged in the transportation of flammable and
combustible liquids in cargo trucks to be equipped with a GPS system. The GPS system
would enable the motor carrier to find the truck’s location at any time. The legislation
also required installation of remote vehicle shutdown (RVS) devices on all Californiadomiciled trucks carrying hazardous materials. The RVS devices had to be accessible to
California Highway Patrol (CHP) officials so that CHP would be able to remotely disable a
truck by activating the truck’s RVS device.
AB 575 was designed to give law
enforcement and fleet owners more control of hazmat trucks in the event of a hijacking
by a terrorist or a mentally unstable individual.
The bill had particularly strong support from California’s law enforcement community –
especially the California Highway Patrol. CHP’s support of the bill was due, in part, to an
incident that occurred in early 2001. In that incident, a driver slammed an 18-wheeler
into California’s state Capitol building. The driver – an ex-convict and mental patient –
was killed in the crash. The truck was destroyed by fire and $10million in damage was
done to the Capitol building. According to CHP officials, had the truck been carrying a
flammable or explosive substance, the entire Capitol building would have been
destroyed.
AB 575 passed easily in the state assembly but was sidetracked in the
California senate in the face of opposition by the trucking industry which argued that it
would place too much financial burden on hazmat transporters and that too little thought
had been given to implementation, especially related to CHP access to RVS devices on
the trucks. California legislators plan to reintroduce the bill in modified form in the
future.
The need to protect the hazmat supply chain has captured the attention of U.S.
legislators.
In the 108th Congress, the United States Senate considered an
amendment introduced by Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) to the Department of
Homeland Security’s appropriations bill that would have required:

In 2004, the U.S. Senate
considered an amendment to the
DHS appropriations bill requiring
hazmat GPS tracking and written
route plans.

1.

trucks transporting hazardous materials to be equipped with global positioning
satellite (GPS) tracking devices; and

2.

written route plans to be prepared and filed with DHS prior to transporting
hazardous materials.

Noting the growing preference of terrorists to use truck bombs in their attacks, Schumer
remarked on the Senate floor,
...”You can buy a car and pay a couple hundred bucks more and have a GPS system which
tells exactly where the vehicle is. Wouldn’t it make sense that every truck carrying hazardous
material was required to have such a GPS system? That would mean if the truck were stolen,
if the truck were taken to a far different location than where it should be and the company
wished to find out where it was, we could find it in a minute.”
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Schumer’s amendment drew opposition from the American Trucking Associations (ATA).
The ATA criticized the measure as unnecessarily burdensome and characterized GPSGPS
based tracking systems as expensive and “easily defeated.” Republicans and several
farm state
ate Democrats combined to defeat the measure. Sen. Thad Cochran (R(R
Mississippi), chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, argued that other measures were already in place to address
hazmat security, including shipper
hipper training and Highway Watch® programs as well as a
research effort by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to test and evaluate a
variety of technologies, including GPS, for identifying potentially dangerous vehicles.

The amendment was opposed
by the American Trucking
Associations, and tabled in the
U.S. Senate.

The Senate voted 55-34
34 to table the Schumer amendment, instead adopting a more
modest proposal from Sen. Harry M. Reid (D-Nevada)
(D
that appropriated $2 million to
support efforts for identification and tracking of trucks carrying hazmat cargoes and $53
million to continue and expand upon the background check system for commercial driver
licenses with a hazmat endorsement.
In the October 2004 issue of GPS World,
World a leading trade magazine, the magazine’s
editor criticized ATA’s opposition to GPS-based
GPS
tracking systems for hazmat shipments
as being disingenuous and short-sighted.
sighted. 7
“…Ironically, for years a rapidly growing number of trucking companies have been
outfitting their fleets with just the kind of capability that ATA dismisses as an expensive,
vulnerable, and cumbersome mandate, primarily because of the increased productivity
that results.
Of course, this is not the first instance of an industry resisting a security mandate. After
9/11, commercial airlines resisted some suggestions for methods of increasing security
against terrorists, or argued that the government should pay for these measures. The
dissenters
ters usually have some credible reasons for not complying with the directive.
Privacy. Cost. Bureaucratic burden. Inadequate preparation time. But the unspoken
motive often seems to come from just not wanting to be obliged to do something.
It brings to mind
ind the closing stanza of Rudyard Kipling’s poem, “The Lesson,” composed
in the wake of the disastrous Boer War: “We have forty million reasons for failure, but not
a single excuse.”

The trucking industry’s motivation
for resisting the amendment’s
hazmat GPS tracking requirement
was motivated by “just not
wanting to be obliged (by the
government) to do something….
…Clearly, GPS is not a complete
solution for the security needs of
the U.S. transportation system.
But just as clearly GPS should be
a part of that solution. It's past
time to make it so.”
Editor - GPS World
October
2004

Clearly, GPS is not a complete solution for the security needs of the U.S.
U
transportation
system. But just as clearly GPS should be a part of that solution. It’s past time to make it
so. “

In the 109th Congress, Senate Bill 1052 – sponsored by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
and co-sponsored
sponsored by Schumer and others – would have required the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Secretary of Transportation to develop a National Public
Sector Response System patterned on the PSRC concept from the FMCSA hazmat
security study. The bill was referred out of committee for debate by the full Senate on
February 27, 2006 and has yet to be scheduled for full debate. Senate Bill
Bil 1052 failed
to survive Senate debates, but it is notable in that it recognized the need for a Hazmat
Public Sector Reporting Center and embraced the idea that a regulatory “push” – like
that implemented in Singapore - is needed to promote smart truck technology
tec
deployment.

U.S. Senate Bill 1052 would
have authorized DHS/DOT to
develop
a
hazmat
PSRC;
regulations would drive smart
truck technology adoption.

4.2 PL 110-53 requires TSA to develop a hazmat truck tracking program.
Section 1554 of PL 110-53 directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, through the TSA Administrator, to develop a program to facilitate the tracking
of motor carrier shipments of security--sensitive materials and to equip vehicles used in
such shipments with technology
ology that provides frequent or continuous communications,
vehicle position location and tracking capabilities, and a feature that allows the driver to
broadcast an emergency distress signal. The text of Section 1554 follows.

7

PL 110-53 requires TSA to
develop
a
hazmat
truck
tracking program.

“Hazmat Keeps On Truckin’,” October 1, 2004, GPS World http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=126157
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SECTION
TION 1554. MOTOR CARRIER SECURITY-SENSITIVE
SENSITIVE MATERIAL TRACKING.
(a) Communications.-Communications.

PL 110-53 requires that TSA’s
truck
tracking
program
be
consistent with the findings
of
TSA’s
Hazmat
Truck
Security Pilot.

(1) In general.--Not
general. Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act,
consistent with the findings of the Transportation Security Administration's
hazardous materials truck security pilot program,
program, the Secretary, through the
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration and in consultation with the
Secretary of Transportation, shall develop a program to facilitate the tracking of motor
carrier shipments of security-sensitive
security
materials and to equip vehicles used in such
shipments with technology that provides-(A) frequent or continuous communications;
(B) vehicle position location and tracking capabilities; and
(C) a feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency
eme
distress
signal.
(2) Considerations.--In
Considerations. In developing the program required by paragraph (1), the
Secretary shall-shall
(A) consult with the Secretary of Transportation to coordinate the program with any
ongoing or planned efforts for motor carrier or security-sensitive
sensitive materials tracking at
the Department of Transportation;
(B) take into consideration the recommendations and findings of the report on the
hazardous material safety and security operational field test released by the Federal
Motor Carrier
Carri Safety Administration on November 11, 2004; and
(C) evaluate-evaluate

The TSA hazmat truck tracking
program must factor the FMCSA
Field Operations Test results
into its design (refer to Section
3.1).

(i) any new information related to the costs and benefits of deploying, equipping, and utilizing
tracking technology, including portable tracking technology, for motor carriers transporting
security--sensitive
sensitive materials not included in the hazardous material safety and security
operational field test report
report released by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration on
November 11, 2004;
(ii) the ability of tracking technology to resist tampering and disabling;
(iii) the capability of tracking technology to collect, display, and store information regarding the
movement of shipments of security-sensitive
security sensitive materials by commercial motor vehicles;
(iv) the appropriate range of contact intervals between the tracking technology and a
commercial motor vehicle transporting security-sensitive
security
materials;

The law requires TSA to consider
a number of things including:

(v) technology that allows the
the installation by a motor carrier of concealed electronic devices on
commercial motor vehicles that can be activated by law enforcement authorities to disable the
vehicle or alert emergency response resources to locate and recover security-sensitive
security
materials
in the event of loss or theft of such materials;

 cost/benefit of “smart truck”
technology deployment;

(vi) whether installation of the technology described in clause (v) should be incorporated into
the program under paragraph (1);

 ability to resist tampering and
disabling;
 contact intervals (polling
rates); and
 vehicle immobilization.

PL 110-53 allocates $7 million
for the current fiscal year and
$7 million/year for the following
two fiscal years to fund TSA’s
hazmat truck tracking program.

(vii) the costs, benefits, and practicality of such technology described in clause (v) in the
context of the overall benefit to national security, including commerce in transportation; and
(viii) other systems and information the Secretary determines appropriate.

(b) Funding.--From
Funding.
the amounts appropriated pursuant to section 114(w) of title 49,
United States Code, as amended by section 1503 of this Act, there shall be made
available to the Secretary to carry out this section-(1) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 of which $3,000,000 may be used for equipment;
(2) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2009 of which $3,000,000
$3,000,000 may be used for equipment;
(3) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2010 of which $3,000,000 may be used for equipment.
(c) Report.---Not
Not later than 1 year after the issuance of regulations under subsection (a),
the Secretary shall issue a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the
program developed and evaluation carried out under this section.
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(d) Limitation.--The
The Secretary may not mandate the installation or utilization of a
technology described under this section without additional congressional authority
provided after the date
e of enactment of this Act.
4.3 PL 110-53
53 requires DHS to evaluate hazmat truck routes.
Section 1553 of PL 110-53 directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security to: (1) document existing and proposed routes for the transportation of
hazardous materials by motor carrier; (2) assess and characterize such routes to
identify measurable criteria for selecting
selectin routes based on safety and security concerns;
(3) prepare guidance materials for state officials to assist them in identifying and
reducing safety concerns and security risks when designating routes for hazardous
materials; and (4) complete an assessment of the safety and national security benefits
achieved under existing requirements for route plans for explosives and radioactive
materials. The text of Section 1553 follows.

PL 110-53 requires DHS to
evaluate
truck
transportation
routes
for
radioactive
and
nonradioactive
hazardous
materials.

SEC. 1553. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS HIGHWAY ROUTING
(a) Route Plan Guidance.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary, shall-shall
(1) document existing and proposed routes for the transportation of radioactive and
nonradioactive hazardous materials by motor carrier, and develop a framework for using
a geographic information system-based
based approach to characterize routes in the national
hazardous materials route registry;
(2) assess and characterize existing and proposed routes for the transportation of
o
radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials by motor carrier for the purpose of
identifying measurable criteria for selecting routes based on safety and security
concerns;
(3) analyze current route-related
related hazardous materials regulations in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico to identify cross-border
border differences and conflicting regulations;
(4) document the safety and security concerns of the public, motor carriers, and State,
local, territorial, and tribal governments about the highway routing of hazardous
materials;
(5) prepare guidance materials for State officials to assist
ass
them in identifying and
reducing both safety concerns and security risks when designating highway routes for
hazardous materials consistent with the 13 safety-based
safety
nonradioactive materials
routing criteria and radioactive materials routing criteria in subpart C part 397 of title
49, Code of Federal Regulations;8

PL 110-53 requires DHS to
develop a tool that will enable
State
officials
to
examine
potential hazmat routes and to
assess security risks associated
with each route.

(6) develop a tool that will enable State officials to examine potential routes for the
highway transportation of hazardous materials, assess specific security risks associated
with each route, and explore alternative mitigation measures; and
(7) transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the actions taken
to fulfill paragraphs (1) through (6) and any recommended changes to the routing
requirements for the highway transportation of hazardous materials in part 397 of title
49, Code of Federal Regulations.
(b) Route Plans.-(1) Assessment.--Not
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Transportation shall complete an assessment of the safety and national
security benefits achieved under existing requirements for route plans, in written or

8

Under PL 110-53 DOT must
require motor carriers subject to
FMCSA’s
hazardous
material
safety permitting requirements
to maintain, follow, and carry a
route
plan
in
written
or
electronic format.

Refer to 49CFR 397.71. In establishing, maintaining, or enforcing a specific non-radioactive
non radioactive hazmat route, a state must consider
the following federal standards: population density; type of highway; types and quantities of NRHM; emergency
mergency response
capabilities; results
esults of consultation with affected persons;
persons exposure and other risk factors; terrain
errain considerations;
considerations continuity of
routes; alternative routes; effects
ffects on commerce;
commerce delays in transportation; climatic conditions; and congestion
ongestion and accident history.
histor
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electronic format, for explosives and radioactive materials. The assessment shall, at a
minimum-(A) compare the percentage of Department of Transportation recordable incidents and
the severity of such
such incidents for shipments of explosives and radioactive materials for
which such route plans are required with the percentage of recordable incidents and the
severity of such incidents for shipments of explosives and radioactive materials not
subject to such route plans; and
(B) quantify the security and safety benefits, feasibility, and costs of requiring each
motor carrier that is required to have a hazardous material safety permit under part 385
of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to maintain, follow,
follow, and carry such a route plan
that meets the requirements of section 397.101 of that title when transporting the type
and quantity of hazardous materials described in section 385.403, taking into account
the various segments of the motor carrier industry,
industry, including tank truck, truckload and
less than truckload carriers.
(2) Report.---Not
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of Transportation shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
containing the findings and conclusions of the assessment.
(c) Requirement.--The
Requirement.
Secretary shall require motor carriers that have a hazardous
material safety permit under part 385 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to
maintain, follow, and carry a route plan, in written or electronic format,
format that meets the
requirements of section 397.101 of that title when transporting the type and quantity of
hazardous materials described in section 385.403 if the Secretary determines, under the
assessment required in subsection (b), that such a requirement would enhance security
se
and safety without imposing unreasonable costs or burdens upon motor carriers.
4.4 TSA plans to expand on the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot program.
TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security
Pilot has proven that a hazmat
tracking program is feasible.
TSA believes the pilot program
has
established
a
solid
foundation for implementing PL
110-53.

PL 110-53
53 requires TSA to develop its hazmat tracking program to be consistent with
the findings of TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security Pilot. The TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot
was completed April 2008 and is described in Section 4.2 of this report. On February
Februar
25, 2008, the project team met with representatives of TSA’s Transportation
Transport
Sector
Network Management Branch of the Highway Motor Carrier Programs Office.
Office The project
team was provided with a document describing TSA’s high-level
high level plan for implementing
H.R.
R. 1. It is included in this report as Appendix C.
In its plan for implementing H.R. 1, TSA stated that its Hazmat Truck Security Pilot
demonstrates the feasibility of implementing a hazmat truck tracking program.
“The pilot project has shown that the transition from pilot to program is feasible. It
has demonstrated a prototype for a centralized truck tracking center. The truck
tracking center was used to coordinate incident response with appropriate first
responders and a government intelligence operations
operations center. The truck tracking
center system collected data in real-time
real
from carrier-operated
operated systems utilized in the
field. Upon receiving an alert notification or upon detection of an abnormal condition,
truck tracking center dispatchers helped manage
manage the process of notifying stakeholders
and coordinating responses to transportation security incidents.”
Furthermore, TSA pointed out in its plan that its Hazmat Truck Security Pilot established
the foundation for satisfying the three general requirements of §1554(a)(1) of H.R. 1.

TSA has prepared a high-level
implementation plan to meet its
legislative responsibilities under
PL 110-53; TSA will enhance the
functionality of the pilot program
prototype.



Frequent or continuous communications – TSA has developed a set of tested
protocols that are capable of interfacing with (a) existing truck tracking systems, (b)
state/local law enforcement agencies and first responders and (c) with federal
intelligence and emergency management centers.



Vehicle
cle position location and tracking capabilities – TSA has implemented a
tested and functioning truck tracking center that allows TSA to “continually” monitor
truck locations and track load types in all of the continental United States.



A feature that allows
allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency
distress signal – TSA has developed a concept of operations that has gone

Appendix B - TSA Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items

through considerable testing and being vetted by government and industry
volunteers. This concept of operations facilitates effective responses to drivers’
emergency distress signals.
TSA plans to take the following actions as a follow-up to the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot:
1.

further develop its standards-based communications interface to adapt to evolving
technical and functional requirements;

2.

fully develop and implement a scalable truck tracking center to function as a central
operations control area to (i) collect data from motor carriers, (ii) monitor events
and coordinate a response, and (iii) facilitate communications to support a
coordinated response; and

3.

further refine the systems and algorithms that provide the foundation of truck
tracking center system’s risk-based approach to transportation event management.
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Appendix C
Truck Tracking Center Technology
XFML(Electronic) Forms
Electronic forms (e-forms) are increasingly replacing inefficient and labor-intensive
paper forms in government and industry. The Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act of 2000, also known as the E-Sign law, gave digital signatures
the same legal weight as those signed on paper. The E-Sign Law allowed government
and private organizations to place more of their business processes on-line including
those that require legally binding signatures.
E-Sign has also supported the
development of e-forms software to support on-line business transactions.

The Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce
Act of 2000 enabled digital
signatures/electronic forms to
replace paper-based
transactions.

Electronic (XFML) forms satisfy public and private digital business needs.1
Forms are vital components of most organizations’ business processes. They are the
interface point between people and processes, and they supply information to the
applications that drive the business. Forms are significant factors in determining how
efficiently a process works – and in turn, how smoothly an entire business operates.
Companies such as Adobe, Microsoft, and IBM have developed sophisticated e-forms
software to connect documents, people, and business processes. Paul Chan, Program
Director for IBM Lotus Forms, offers the following perspective on the use of e-forms in
the organization.
“A form is a living, breathing transactional document that interacts with users and
information and systems across the enterprise. Today more than 80% of the processes
in public and private businesses depend on forms. In each case the form is what initiates
the process, it’s the vehicle that drives the process through its lifecycle and that kicks off
other related processes, and it’s the surviving record of all approvals and transactions
once the process is complete. It follows that to have any appreciable impact on
operational cost and efficiency, an electronic forms solution has to interact with just
about every client and every back-end system in the organization.”

“(An e-form) is a living,
breathing transactional
document that interacts with
users and information and
systems across the enterprise.”
Paul Chan, IBM

An e-form is much more than an on-line alternative to a paper form. An e-form is a
rich, intelligent, time- and cost-saving front end to an organization’s on-line business
processes. E-forms software allows organizations to develop secure and intelligent
online forms, deploy them to virtually any client, and integrate them with back-end
systems and services.
An e-form, often referred to as an XFML e-form, is made up of four XML components –
1). Presentation (look & layout); 2). Business logic; 3). Data; and 4). XML attachments.
E-forms software provides a single envelope for all four XML components, and one of the
most important features of e-forms is that the XML components of the form are not
disaggregated as the e-form is processed by the system. For example, when a user
applies a digital signature to an e-form, e-form software “locks” the signature to the
form exactly as it appeared when the user signed it, and stores that signed version of
the form in the database. This is particularly important when multiple & sequential
signatures are applied to a form and the form has regulatory or legal importance (i.e.
hazardous waste manifest form).

An e-form’s XML components
are not ‘disaggregated’ as the eform is processed through an
application’s workflow – a major
advantage of e-forms.

E-forms serve business processes and the workflow associated with business processes.
Dynamic e-forms can be deployed to match workflow needs. Security features keep
transactions safe and ensure that data is not tampered with. Entire e-form records may
be compressed and stored and data from e-forms flow directly into system databases.

1

This discussion is based on whitepapers published by IBM describing IBM’s Lotus Forms product. Lotus Forms is an e-forms
product based on XML/XFDL technology. It has the functionality that would be needed in an XML e-forms product that would meet
the business requirements of the hazardous waste e-manifest process. For an overview of e-forms and Lotus Forms: http://www01.ibm.com/software/lotus/products/forms/ For an introduction to document security:
http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg27006755&aid=1
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Intelligence can be programmed
into e-forms to help users avoid
errors.

One of the biggest advantages of an online form, compared to a paper form, is the
ability to build “intelligence” into the online form. XFML forms can provide sophisticated
error checking as the user fills out the form, preventing possible errors (and wasted time
as incomplete or erroneous forms are returned to the sender).
E-forms create great value for organizations. For example, the U.S. Army is in the
process of a large-scale project to convert its inventory of 100,000 forms used by 1.4
million people from a paper-based system to an e-forms system using IBM’s Workplace
Forms™ technology. Internal Army auditors estimate the Army will save $1.3 billion per
year when the project is completed.2
Digital signatures ensure document integrity and prevent signature repudiation by
system users.

In the on-line environment,
document security is a function
of:

authentication;

confidentiality;

authorization; and

integrity.

Authentication - How do you
know where the document came
from?

In the on-line environment, document security is critical for applications that focus on
the delivery, routing, storing and viewing of documents (e.g. electronic forms).
Document security in the on-line environment is a function of a system’s ability to
maintain document: 1). authentication; 2). authorization; 3). confidentiality; and 4).
integrity.
Authentication involves verification of the identification of a user. This is typically
performed at a system level rather than a document level for document access, although
there are two points at which a user’s identity is critical – when users access documents,
and when documents containing digital signatures are assessed. At both points it is
critical to ensure that the user is positively identified. System authentication is normally
handled by standard web or network-based authentication protocols (i.e., mutual SSL
authentication or Windows Network authentication). This type of authentication can
enable a system to make authorization decisions. Document-level authentication can
also be useful, when the document format permits. Certain types of e-form documents
have the capacity to embed decision logic that can detect and respond to an
authenticated user via a digital signature or information passed into the document from
server-side processes.
A digital signature is created by using a third-party-issued digital certificate. The digital
certificate must be provided to the user in such a way as to ensure adequate assurance
of the user’s actual identity. Many organizations use company-issued cards on which the
signing certificate is stored or have security policies in place regarding the issuance of
purely electronic certificates. Information from either the certificate or server-side
authentication can be used by logic built into the document to restrict access to parts of
the document, determine which portions are visible, and block write-access to portions
as required if a user is not authenticated properly. Authentication that will be used for
multiple levels of access should contain information on access level or role. This
information can be embedded within a user’s digital certificate or stored on a central
server and linked to the user’s ID.

Authorization - What permissions
does the user have for working
with the document?

Authorization is closely linked to authentication, and encompasses the process by
which a user or user level is permitted access to different levels or parts of an
application. The degree of authorization complexity and security will depend on the
application. Typically, applications that define a hierarchical role structure require more
complex authorization procedures, in which not only is the user identified, but
credentials for the current access level are analyzed also.
Authorization can also occur at various places in an application. Most applications will
require authorization for user login, document access, document submission, data
queries, and so on. With the exception of user login, most of these authorizations are
transparent to the user (single sign-on). Single sign-on systems can be extended to use
within the context of the document itself. Document formats that support internal logic
can make decisions regarding which sections of a document are available to the user.
This is typically accomplished by server-side insertion of session sign-on information into
the document or by embedding the document in HTML for portal use. The advantages of
in-document authorization are mainly in the area of usability and error reduction. For
example, sections of a paper form that are to be filled in by someone with manager
credentials can be made read-only or invisible for someone without those credentials.

2

http://www306.ibm.com/software/swnews/swnews.nsf/n/nhan6h9k99?OpenDocument&Site=lotus

Appendix C – Truck Tracking Center Technology

This makes multi-stage documents significantly less error-prone, as well as easier for all
users.
In-document authorization can also allow for sensitive information to be
contained in a document but not available to every user of that document.
Confidentiality refers to the ability of the system or document to restrict the access of
data to authorized users. Data may be in the form of documents or http-based streams
(or both). Confidentiality assures that no-one can see or copy the data without the
knowledge or permission of the system.
Confidentiality is typically provided through encryption of document or data, and is
employed throughout a system. The majority of applications implement transmission
confidentiality through the use of secure socket layer (SSL) to encrypt any user-toserver or web services-based communications. As an added layer of confidentiality, it is
possible to implement document encryption using a public/private key methodology to
ensure that only the owner of the private key can decrypt the document. If the
document format supports it, it is possible to store the information regarding permitted
access within the document itself.
Integrity refers to the assurance that the document being viewed is exactly the same
as the document a user filled out. This is extremely important in documents that are
legally binding or have regulatory importance. Document integrity is implemented at
the document level but can be checked at various points throughout the system.
Document integrity is typically implemented by use of a digital signature, which is
generated by a document hash combined with information from the signer’s digital
certificate – usually a private key. Biometric information can also be used to generate
the digital signature. Many document formats provide only full-document signing
capabilities; that is, the user can sign the whole document at once, typically when it has
been completed. This type of document integrity is best for single-user documents, since
signatures can only be applied to the whole document. Other document formats support
multi-stage and overlapping signatures (as well as whole-document signing). A user
may fill out part of a form, sign that part, then send the form to another user who can
fill out and sign another part of it. The second user’s signature can also cover the first
user’s, which would prevent the first user from subsequently altering anything. This
flexibility most closely approaches the process that most forms-based processes
naturally follow. It also provides the capability to ensure step-by-step document
integrity, rather than simply end-product document integrity.
Digital signatures can be used to ensure the integrity of the document by locking all
items covered by the signature. Changes to fields or other input items cannot be made
once a signature has been applied. Other changes (data, positioning, formatting,
visibility, overlap of other elements, etc.) also cannot be made without invalidating that
signature on the document. Once the form has been signed by a user, it can also be
notarized by an automatic process on the server side for increased assurance of
document integrity. Digital signatures also prevent an individual who has signed a
document from denying the signature (non-repudiation).

Confidentiality - Who is allowed
access to the document?

Integrity - How do you know if
the
document
has
been
altered?

Digital signatures ensure
document integrity, and
prevent signature repudiation
by system users.

Business Rules Engines3
A business rules engine is a software system that executes one or more business rules
in a runtime production environment. The rules might come from regulation ("hazmat
carriers without a CDL cannot accept a hazmat shipmet"), company policy ("only carriers
authorized by the company can accept a hazmat shipment"), or other sources (“carriers
of a high-hazard material that cross geofence #267 will trigger a system alert”).
Rule engine software is commonly provided as a component of a business rule
management system which, among other functions, provides the ability to: register,
define, classify, and manage all the rules, verify consistency of rules definitions (”high
risk hazmat carriers must report vehicle location every x minutes when it is within y
miles of a tunnel” and “high risk hazmat carriers must reporting frequency may not
exceed 15 minutes” ), define the relationships between different rules, and relate some

3

Business rule engines allow
developers to separate
business rules from application
code. This is important when
rules change often.

This discussion is adapted from the Wikipedia article, Business Rules Engine http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_engine
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of these rules to IT applications that are affected or need to enforce one or more of the
rules.
In any IT application, business rules change more frequently than the rest of the
application code. Rules engines (or inference engines) are the pluggable software
components that execute business rules that have been separated from application code
as part of a business rules approach. This allows the business users to modify the rules
frequently without the need of IT intervention and hence allows the applications to be
more adaptable with the dynamic rules.
Business rules produce
knowledge; work flows perform
business work.

Many organizations' rules efforts combine aspects of what is generally considered workflow design with traditional rule design. This failure to separate the two approaches can
lead to problems with the ability to re-use and control both business rules and
workflows. Design approaches that avoid this quandary separate the role of business
rules and work flows.
Business rules produce knowledge; work flows perform business work. Concretely, that
means that a business rule may do things like detect that a business situation has
occurred and raise a business event (typically carried via a messaging infrastructure) or
create higher level business knowledge (e.g., evaluating the series of organizational,
product, and regulatory-based rules). On the other hand, a work flow would respond to
an event by initiating a series of activities.

A business rule will detect that
a business situation has
occurred and raise a business
event (typically carried via a
messaging infrastructure). On
the other hand, a work flow
would respond to an event by
initiating a series of activities.

This separation is important because the same business judgment or business event can
be reacted to by many different work flows. Embedding the work done in response to
rule-driven knowledge creation into the rule itself greatly reduces the ability of business
rules to be reused across an organization because it makes them work-flow specific.
To deliver this type of architecture it is essential to establish the integration between a
BPM (Business Process Management) and BRM (Business Rules Management) platform
that is based upon processes responding to events or examining business judgments
that are defined by business rules. There are some products in the marketplace that
provide this integration natively. In other situations this type of abstraction and
integration will have to be developed within a particular project or organization.
Most Java-based rules engines provide a technical call-level interface, based on the JSR94 application programming interface (API) standard, in order to allow for integration
with different applications, and many rule engines allow for service-oriented integrations
through Web-based standards such as WSDL and SOAP.
Most rule engines supply the ability to develop a data abstraction that represents the
business entities and relationships that rules should be written against. This business
entity model can typically be populated from a variety of sources including XML, POJOs,
flat files, etc. There is no standard language for writing the rules themselves. Many
engines use a Java-like syntax, while some allow the definition of custom business
friendly languages.
Most rules engines function as a callable library. However, it is becoming more popular
for them to run as a generic process akin to the way that RDBMSs behave. Most engines
treat rules as a configuration to be loaded into their process instance, although some are
actually code generators for the whole rule execution instance and others allow the user
to choose.
There are two different classes of rule engines, both of which are usually forward
chaining. The first class processes so-called production/inference rules. These types of
rules are used to represent behaviors of the type IF condition THEN action. For example,
such a rule could answer the question: "Should TSA declare a transportation security
incident?" by executing rules of the form "IF some-condition THEN allow-customer-amortgage".
The other type of rule engine processes so-called reaction/Event Condition Action rules.
The reactive rule engines detect and react to incoming events and process event
patterns. For example, a reactive rule engine could be used to alert a watch officer that
an unusually high number of dangerous hazmat shipments are moving toward an urban
area.
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The biggest difference between these types is that production rule engines execute when
a user or application invokes them, usually in a stateless manner. A reactive rule engine
reacts automatically when events occur, usually in a stateful manner. Many (and indeed
most) popular commercial rule engines have both production and reaction rule
capabilities, although they might emphasize one class over another. For example, most
business rules engines are primarily production rules engines, whereas Complex Event
Processing rules engines emphasize reaction rules.

A production rule engine
executes when an application
invokes it. A reactive rule
engine reacts automatically
when events occur.

Web-based crisis information management software supports
“virtual” operations centers.4
Information is of little value if it is not collected, evaluated and used in a timely matter.
Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) allows information to be collected from
a variety of sources and then be evaluated, shared or viewed by any authorized user.
Most CIMS applications are web-based placing integrated crisis information management
within reach of most emergency management agencies. Any authorized user with
internet access can log into an emergency operations center and gain access to the
support offered by the center. This “virtualization” of emergency operations centers
dramatically extends their reach and functionality in responding to an incident. The
latest versions of some of these applications support handheld devices such as the
BlackBerry, Treo/Palm, and the Windows Mobile systems.
WebEOC™ is an example of one of the commercial CIMS packages on the market. It is
a web-based information management system that provides a single access point for the
collection and dissemination of emergency or event-related information. It was designed
to aid decision making by providing authorized users real-time information in a userfriendly format. WebEOC™ can be used during the planning, mitigation, response and
recovery phases of any emergency. It can also be used by agencies during day-to-day
activities to manage routine, non-emergency related operations.
Information from WebEOC™ can be viewed on individual PC's or displayed onto any
number of large screens. It will display text-based lists and reports in conjunction with
graphics, maps, video, live TV camera, contact lists and other information needed in an
emergency situation. All windows are scalable and movable; and any number of
windows can be displayed on any screen, or any window can be displayed across all
screens.
WebEOC™ integrates data, video, messaging, and many other types of information. It
distributes that information both to individual terminals and to projection screens. It also
allows for remote access via the Internet for authorized users. Being able to share real
time information with other agencies in an area can allow for more rapid deployment of
the regional resources available to emergency managers.
MapTac™, a companion software product, can interface with other standard mapping
applications and provides a tactical mapping capability that offers common or agency
specific mapping views (fire, police, hazmat, etc). WebEOC™ is configurable at the
administrator level without need of a programmer. The software can accommodate the
Incident Command System (ICS) and FEMA’s ESF structure. WebEOC™ offers
chronological and categorical status boards of one or multiple incident/events with user
configurable screens. Status reports can be directly input by individual responders. It
also features a Drill Simulator offering the capability to construct exercises that are
scenario based. Real-time links to 911 CAD systems are also possible through
WebEOC™.

4

Crisis information management
software helps run emergency
operations centers.

“Virtualization” of emergency
operations center allows
authorized users in the field to
gain access to information and
incident management tools at
the emergency operations
center.

This section highlights a leading CIMS software package, WebEOC™. It was developed at the DOE Savannah River complex and is
used by most DOE installations at their primary emergency management tool. The emergency management agencies in Louisville
and Lexington both use WebEOC™. Website: http://www.esi911.com/home/
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